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I. INTRODUCTION
All forms of sexual violence, including forced pregnancies, have been
used as tools of oppression and control over women and girls from time
immemorial.1 Historically, however, the rules and practices of international
criminal law have often overlooked violations of reproductive rights.2
Therefore, it was a remarkable milestone when, on February 4, 2021, the
International Criminal Court (ICC) handed down its judgment in the case
of Dominic Ongwen, a former fighter with the Sinia Brigade of the Lord’s
Resistance Army in northern Uganda.3 In a judgment of more than 1,000
pages, the court found the former child soldier guilty of sixty-one of the
seventy counts against him, including all sexual and gender-based crimes.4
For the first time since its inception in 2002, the ICC found the accused
guilty of the crime of forced pregnancy as both a crime against humanity
and a war crime.5 The Court found that some of Dominic Ongwen’s ‘wives’
had become pregnant as a result of repeated rapes and that they were
confined since they were not allowed to leave the camp or they would be
killed.6
This decision set an important precedent since, in the two decades that
followed the creation of the ICC, independent specialized organizations
have regularly reported cases of forced pregnancies committed in total
impunity in various regions of the world. In Nigeria, the United Nations
(U.N.) Human Rights Council has found that women and girls that were
sexually abused repeatedly by Boko Haram rebels while captive were also
1. See Fourth World Conference on Women, World Conference on Women: Action for
Equality, Development and Peace, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1 (Sept. 15, 1995)
[hereinafter Beijing Convention]; U.N. Secretary-General, Conflict-Related Sexual
Violence, U.N. Doc. S/2019/280 (Mar. 29, 2019); U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Hum.
Rts, Women’s Rights Are Human Rights, U.N. Doc. [ST/]HR/PUB/14/2, at 93 (2014).
2. Dieneke De Vos, Colombia’s Constitutional Court Issues Landmark Decision
Recognizing Victims of Reproductive Violence in Conflict, EUR. UNIV. INST. (Jan. 11, 2020),
https://me.eui.eu/dieneke-de-vos/blog/colombias-constitutional-court-issues-landmarkdecision-recognising-victims-of-reproductive-violence-in-conflict/ (last visited Apr. 4,
2022); Rosemary Grey, The ICC’s First ‘Forced Pregnancy’ Case in Historical Perspective,
15 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 905, 906 (2017); VIRGINIE LADISCH, INT’L CTR . FOR TRANSITIONAL
JUST., FROM REJECTION TO REDRESS: OVERCOMING LEGACIES OF CONFLICT-RELATED
SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN UGANDA (2015) (focusing on the situation in Uganda and
the lack of accountability for crimes which have led to motherhood); Ciara Laverty &
Dieneke De Vos, ‘Ntaganda’ in Colombia: Intra-Party Reproductive Violence at the
Colombian
Constitutional
Court,
OPINIOJURIS,
(Feb.
25,
2020),
http://opiniojuris.org/2020/02/25/ntaganda-in-colombia-intra-party-reproductive-violenceat-the-colombian-constitutional-court/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2022).
3. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, Judgment (Feb. 4, 2021).
4. Id.
5. Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., Dominic Ongwen Declared Guilty of War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity Committed in Uganda, U.N. Press Release ICC-CPI-20210204PR1564
(Feb.
4,
2021)
[available
at:
https://www.icccpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1564] (last visited Apr. 4, 2022).
6. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 3057–3058.
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victims of forced pregnancies.7 In some instances, rebels thought that the
children of the women that they had raped would be born radicalized and
form the next generation of fighters.8 In Myanmar, Rohingya Muslims have
been victims of a violent campaign led by the Burmese Military, Border
Guards, and police forces, including cases of unwanted and forced
pregnancies.9 These are not isolated incidents. Similar abuses have also
occurred in South Sudan,10 Mali,11 and Northern Uganda, to name a few.12
Given the failure of this provision of the Rome Statute to deter
perpetrators in practice, and the academic criticism of its definition for the
crime of forced pregnancy,13 this judgment is an opportunity to undertake
a closer analysis of Article 7(2)(f), which provides that:
“Forced pregnancy” means the unlawful detention of a woman who
is forcibly made pregnant with the intent to alter the ethnic
composition of a population or to commit other serious violations

7. See U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Hum. Rts. Council 29th Session: Update on
Boko
Haram
(July
1,
2015),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16177&LangI
D=E (last visited Apr. 4, 2022).
8. U.N. Urges Nigeria to Ease Abortion Access for Women Raped by Boko Haram, AL
JAZEERA
WITH
AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE
(July
1,
2015),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/7/1/un-urges-nigeria-to-ease-abortionaccess.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2022).
9. GRANT SHUBIN ET AL., GLOBAL JUSTICE CTR., DISCRIMINATION TO DESTRUCTION: A
LEGAL ANALYSIS OF GENDER CRIMES AGAINST THE ROHINGYA 58 (2018). See also U.N.
Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. on the Detailed Findings of the Independent International FactFinding Mission on Myanmar, ¶¶ 546–547, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/CRP.2 (Sept. 17, 2018)
(discussing lack of access to medical services and abortions due to movement restrictions in
the Northern Rakhine state).
10. The internal conflict in South Sudan involves different rebel groups fighting against
government forces. U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Comm’n on Hum. Rts. in South
Sudan, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/43/56 (Jan. 31, 2020). Most of the attacks, including sexual and
gender-based violence, conducted against the civilians were committed by the government
forces to spread terror and to impose authority upon the population. Id. Victims of forced
pregnancies reported experiencing “long-term physical repercussions and severe
psychological trauma.” Id.
11. During this conflict, the population was under the control of Islamist armed groups.
It was found by the court that laic Muslim women were forcibly married to extremist rebels
for several purposes, including to mix the local population from Timbuktu with jihadists
and to create a new generation. Prosecutor v. Al Hassan, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/18, PreTrial Chamber I, Correction to the Decision Regarding the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 570
(2019) [hereinafter Al Hassan Case, ICC].
12. LADISCH, supra note 2.
13. See Milan Markovic, Vessels of Reproduction: Forced Pregnancy and the ICC, 16
MICH. STATE J. INT’L L. 439 (2007); Alyson M. Drake, Aimed at Protecting Ethnic Groups
or Women? A Look at Forced Pregnancy Under the Rome Statute, 18 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 595 (2012); Kristen Boon, Rape and Forced Pregnancy Under the ICC
Statute: Human Dignity, Autonomy, and Consent, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 625 (2001).
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of international law. This definition cannot in any way be
interpreted as affecting national laws on pregnancy.14
A thorough analysis of this definition using a feminist lens is all the
more relevant following the International Law Commission’s (ILC)
submission of the Draft Articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Humanity (Draft Articles), for consideration to the Sixth
Committee of the U.N.—responsible for legal matters—as part of the
provisional agenda to its 76th Session in Autumn 2020.15 Thus, the
U.N.G.A. is currently examining the Draft Articles, including the above
definition of the crime of forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity,16
in order to decide whether to elaborate a new convention on crimes against
humanity.17
Considering this rare opportunity to advance the cause of women, girls,
and any individual who can biologically become pregnant, this article
explains why the international community should reject the inadequate
definition of the crime of forced pregnancy proposed by the ILC. It
questions the appropriateness of copying the definition of the crime of
forced pregnancy into such a new convention, because it perpetuates gender
stereotypes and does not accurately reflect the experience of victims and
survivors. Among other things, the definition of the ILC is gender-biased,
does not promote accountability for the perpetration of crimes related to
reproductive rights, and is outdated in light of the progress made in the past
twenty years regarding the rights of women and girls.
The author proposes instead the adoption of an alternative definition of
the crime of forced pregnancy that aligns with modern norms and values.
The prevalence of these crimes and their gravity in terms of physical and
mental harms—including the most serious cases, in which forced
pregnancies are part of widespread and systematic attacks18—means this

14. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7(2)(f), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
15. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Human., U.N. Doc. A/74/10 (2019) [hereinafter Draft Articles]; G.A. Res. 74/187 (Dec. 18,
2019).
16. Sean D. Murphy (Special Rapporteur), Fourth Rep. on Crimes Against Humanity,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/725 (Feb. 18, 2019) [hereinafter ILC, Fourth Report]; G.A., Rep. of the
Sixth Comm. on Crimes Against Human., U.N. Doc. A/76/474 (Nov. 18, 2021).
17. G.A. Res. 76/114 (Dec. 9, 2021).
18. See e.g., U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, supra note 9 (examining the widespread and
systematic use of forced pregnancies in Myanmar); OFF. OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIM.
CT., REPORT ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES 2012 89 (2012) (examining the
widespread and systematic use of forced pregnancies by Boko Haram in Nigeria);
Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, Prosecution’s Pre-Trial Brief, ¶¶ 38–39
(Mar. 7, 2019) (examining forced pregnancies in Northern Uganda between July 2002 until
approximately December 2005, where evidence indicated the attacks were directed against
civilians, widespread, and systematic).
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crime can no longer include a flawed definition.19 This contribution builds
on the academic criticism of the crime of forced pregnancy under the Rome
Statute and brings it up to date with modern theories of feminism. It also
adds to the surprisingly scarce literature on this topic concerning the recent
definition of the ILC.
This article will proceed in two parts. The first part critically reviews
the development of the crime of forced pregnancy in international criminal
law. It begins by analyzing the historical context surrounding the drafting
process of the crime during the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of 1998. It
turns next to the interpretation of the crime in academic literature and the
few judicial cases to have explored the issue. This article then explains how
the idea of drafting a convention on crimes against humanity came about.
Examining current developments in international criminal law, it explains
how the Sixth Committee should seize this unique opportunity to enact an
instrument that shows gender sensitivity rather than systematically
repeating the wording used in the Rome Statute.
The second part of this article normatively assesses, through a gender
perspective, the definition of the crime of forced pregnancy in the Rome
Statute and Draft Articles. Three critiques of the current definition, taken
together, explain why it should be modified at a future convention. The first
critique concerns the requirement of proving that the perpetrator had an
additional intention. This intention perpetuates gender biases in
international law and encourages institutionalized discrimination against
women. The second critique relates to the addition of the national caveat,
which gives the wrong impression that women’s rights are not universally
recognized in international criminal law. The third critique explains that the
definition is outdated, conflicts with any other fields of international law,
and does not contribute to gender equality. In conclusion, this article
provides recommendations as to how the crime should be defined under a
future convention on crimes against humanity.

II. THE CRIME OF FORCED PREGNANCY UNDER THE
ROME STATUTE: DRAFTING AND DEVELOPMENTS
A. EVOLUTION OF THE PROSECUTION OF SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED
CRIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

International criminal law has long been criticized for lacking gender
sensitivity and for perpetuating gender biases.20 The constitutive

19. Grey, supra note 2, at 907.
20. See ROSEMARY GREY, The Road to Rome, in PROSECUTING SEXUAL AND GENDERBASED CRIMES AT THE INTERNATIONAL COURT: PRACTICE, PROGRESS AND POTENTIAL 67,
122 (Larissa van den Herik & Jean d’Aspremont eds., 2019); Christine Chinkin, Feminist
Interventions into International Law, 19 ADELAIDE L. REV. 13, 16 (1997); Rhonda Copelon,
Surfacing Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes Against Women in Humanitarian Law, 5
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instruments of both the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Tokyo Tribunal are
prime examples of this failure. Neither prosecuted sexual violence crimes,21
despite documented evidence of their occurrence during World War II.22
The situation has been just as deplorable under international
humanitarian law. The law of armed conflict employed for a long time a
patriarchal language to describe sexual and gender-based crimes, using a
male perspective to assess sexual violence.23 Rape, for instance, was first
prohibited in the 1907 Hague Regulations under the protection of “family
honor and rights.”24 In the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the prohibition of
rape became euphemized as a prohibition against violation of the victim’s
“honor.”25 These formulations were problematic for two reasons. First, they
both considered the woman solely as a mother, existing only through her
family unit, and therefore both overlooked the serious impact that such an
offense had on the victim herself as an individual.26 Second, although the
concept of “honor” might have had an important connotation at the time of
the drafting, it failed to accurately depict the mental and physical pain that
victims of sexual violence endure.27 Sexual crimes, including rape, were
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 243 (1994). See generally JUDITH GAIL GARDHAM & MICHELLE J.
JARVIS, WOMEN, ARMED CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2001).
21. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279, 288 (1945) [hereinafter Charter of the International Military Tribunal];
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Special Proclamation by the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589,
reprinted in 4 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 27 (1946).
22. See Radhika Coomaraswamy (Special Rapporteur), Rep. on the Republic of Korea
and Japan on Military Sexual Slavery in Wartime, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/1996/53/Add.1 (Jan.
4, 1996) (documenting the so-called “comfort women” who were violated by the Japanese
army). See generally James W. Messerschmidt, The Forgotten Victims of World War II:
Masculinities and Rape in Berlin, 1945, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 706 (2006); U.N.
Secretary-General, Letter dated May 24, 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President
of the Security Council, ¶ 248, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994); USTINIA DOLGOPOL
& SNEHAL PARANJAPE, INT’L COMM. JURISTS, COMFORT WOMEN, AN UNFINISHED ORDEAL:
REPORT OF A MISSION (1994); BONAIFER NOWROJEE, HUM. RTS. WATCH, SHATTERED LIVES:
SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993).
23. Copelon, supra note 20, at 249. See also THE U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, ITS CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, 15 Y EARS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (1994–2009)—A CRITICAL
REVIEW 58 (Audrey Thompson ed., 2009).
24. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its
Annexes: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 46, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631.
25. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention (III)
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 14, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135.
26. Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 379,
387 (1999).
27. Gloria Gaggioli, Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts: A Violation of International
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 96 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 503, 512 (2014).
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not even explicitly included in the provision on the grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions in 1949.28
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the late 1990s
delivered the first gender-sensitive decisions.29 They acknowledged the
impact of sexual violence on human dignity and, in so doing, acknowledged
it amounted to a breach of core norms of international law. 30 The
constitutive documents of both international tribunals only prohibited the
crime of rape.31 However, investigators’ and prosecutors’ willingness to
focus on the prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes,32 combined
with gender sensitivity on the bench,33 led to the development of a
meaningful jurisprudence on sexual and gender-based violence. Notably,
the tribunals did not endorse a narrow reading of their statutes. For instance,

28. Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 51, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention (III), supra note 25, at art. 130; Geneva Convention (IV),
supra note 25, at art. 147.
29. For instance, in the Akayesu case, the ICTR recognized that rape and other acts of
sexual violence could constitute genocide. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T,
Chamber I Judgment, ¶ 597 (Sept. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Akayesu case, ICTR]. The ICTY,
in turn, was the first tribunal to recognize in the Čelebići camp case that rape could be a
form of torture, and thus could constitute a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions and the
corresponding common article 3. Prosecutor v. Mucić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment, ¶¶ 494–497 (Nov. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Čelebići camp case, ICTY]. In addition,
the Furundžija case was the first case which entirely and solely dealt with sexual violence.
Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (July 21,
2000).
30. Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 183
(Dec. 10, 1998).
31. See S.C. Res. 955, art. 3(g) (Nov. 8, 1994); S.C. Res. 827, art. 5(g) (May 25, 1993).
These provisions respectively established the International Tribunals for Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia, which prohibited rape as a crime against humanity. The ICTR also
implicitly prohibits other forms of sexual and gender-based crimes under the broader—and
inaccurate—term of “outraged upon personal dignity.” See S.C. Res. 955, art. 4(e) (Nov. 8,
1994).
32. For instance, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, Richard Goldstone, decided to
appoint Patricia Sellers as the Legal Advisor on Gender in order to address how sexual and
gender-based violence would be prosecuted. Peggy Kuo, Prosecuting Crimes of Sexual
Violence in an International Tribunal, 34 CASE W. RES. J INT’L L. 305, 309–11 (2002).
Sellers, along with other lawyers and investigators, pushed for the investigation and
prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes which reportedly occurred during the
conflict in former Yugoslavia. Id.
33. For example, the ICTR Trial Chamber’s reasoning in the Akayesu case noted the
“public concern over the historical exclusion of rape and other forms of sexual violence
from the investigation and prosecution of war crimes. The investigation and presentation of
evidence relating to sexual violence is in the interest of justice.” Akayesu case, ICTR, supra
note 29, at ¶ 417.
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they have ruled that, in certain circumstances, rape can constitute
genocide34 or amount to torture.35
Following pressure from feminist groups,36 the codification of sexual
crimes under the Rome Statute began to more accurately reflect the
experience of women.37 The Rome Statute, among others, raised crimes of
sexual violence up to “serious violations of the laws and customs” of
international humanitarian law.38 It also expanded the types of sexual
violence that are prosecutable, including the crimes of sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, and forced pregnancy.39 The Rome Statute thus
represented an important milestone in the fight against impunity for such
crimes and brought gender-sensitive provisions within the framework of
international criminal law.40
Despite this hard-won battle, the definition of the crime of forced
pregnancy as a crime against humanity in the Rome Statute remains
problematic. Before engaging in a critique of this definition, this article will
examine the elements of the crime of forced pregnancy.
B. ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF FORCED PREGNANCY UNDER THE
ROME STATUTE
The crime of forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity is found
under Article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute, which provides that:
For the purpose of this Statute, “crime against humanity” means
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack: Rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.41
Article 7(2)(f) of the Rome Statute further expands on the definition of
forced pregnancy as follows: “the unlawful confinement of a woman
forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition
of any population or carrying out other grave violations of international

34. Akayesu case, ICTR, supra note 29, at ¶¶ 732–734.
35. Čelebići camp case, ICTY, supra note 29.
36. Women Caucus Advocacy in ICC Negotiations: The Crime of Forced Pregnancy,
WOMEN’S
CAUCUS
FOR
GENDER
JUST.,
http://iccwomen.org/wigjdraft1/Archives/oldWCGJ/icc/iccpc/rome/forcedpreg.html (last
visited Apr. 4, 2022).
37. Louise Chappell, Women, Gender and International Institutions: Exploring New
Opportunities at the International Criminal Court, 22 POL’Y & SOC’Y 3, 15 (2003).
38. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at arts. 8(2)(b)(xxi), 8(2)(e)(vi).
39. Chappell, supra note 37.
40. Grey, supra note 20.
41. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 7(1)(g).
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law. This definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national
laws relating to pregnancy.”42
Only one decision of the ICC has interpreted this crime. In Prosecutor
v. Ongwen, the Trial Chamber (Ongwen Trial Decision) interpreted what
the drafters of the Rome Statute intended in a few, but insightful,
paragraphs.43 In this case, Dominic Ongwen, a former Army Commander
of the Lord Resistance Army in Uganda, was charged with several counts
of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including charges of forced
pregnancy.44
As Mr. Ongwen is the first person to be held responsible for the crime
of forced pregnancy, the Ongwen Trial Judgment represents a landmark
holding for the prosecution of crimes concerning reproductive rights.45 This
judgment, read in conjunction with independent human rights experts’
scholarship, can shed light on the legal contours of this crime. In the
following subparts, three main elements of the crime of forced pregnancy
are addressed: the material elements (actus reus), the mental elements
(mens rea), and the national law caveat.
1. The material element of the crime of forced pregnancy
The material element of the crime is the act by the perpetrator of
confining one or more women who were forcibly made pregnant—that is,
the material existence of any coercive circumstance that can undermine a
person’s ability to give genuine and voluntary consent.46 It does not matter
if the alleged perpetrator is involved in the pregnancy,47 nor does it matter
whether the pregnancy is the result of a rape or artificial insemination
against the woman’s will—forcible under the Court’s construction means
the existence of any coercive circumstances that can undermine a person’s
ability to give genuine and voluntary consent.48 Kristen Boon goes even
further in her interpretation of “force” to include acts that prevent a woman
42. Rome Statute, supra note 14.
43. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, Trial Judgment, ¶ 2717–2729
(Feb. 4, 2021) [hereinafter Ongwen Trial Judgment].
44. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, Pre-Trial Decision on
Confirmation of Charges Against Ongwen, ¶ 112 (Mar. 23, 2016) [hereinafter Ongwen, PreTrial Decision].
45. OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, BRIEFING PAPER: THE TRIAL OF DOMINIC ONGWEN
AT THE I NTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 4 (2016); Ephrem Rugiririza, ICC Prosecutor Puts
Sexual Crimes at Heart of Ongwen Trial, JUSTICEINFO.NET (Sept. 9, 2016),
https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/tribunals/icc/29012-icc-prosecutor-puts-sexual-crimes-atheart-of-ongwen-trial.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2022); WOMEN’S INITIATIVE FOR GENDER
JUSTICE, GENDER REPORT CARD ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 123 (2018).
46. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 7(2)(f).
47. Ongwen Trial Judgment, supra note 43, at ¶ 2723; MICHAEL COTTIER, ET AL., Article
8, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 275,
450 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2008).
48. MICHAEL COTTIER, ET AL., supra note 47; Ongwen Trial Judgment, supra note 43, at
¶ 2725.
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from controlling her reproductive cycles: “[i]f a woman is not permitted to
control her reproductive cycles by way of being ‘forcibly’ prevented from
using contraceptives, for example, the acts could constitute evidence of a
forced pregnancy.”49
In any event, the facts that must be present to constitute the crime
include: that the pregnant person did not consent, nor make the free and
deliberate choice, to carry a child;50 and that the perpetrator, while aware
that the woman was forcefully made pregnant,51 placed her “in a position
in which she cannot choose whether to continue the pregnancy.”52
Furthermore, the confinement of the woman should not be compared to
“imprisonment.”53 Rather, it should include any case wherein a woman is
“deprived of her physical liberty[,] including when she, although
theoretically able to leave the place of confinement, de facto cannot go
anywhere e.g. because of being surrounded by enemy territory.” 54
Finally, there is also a temporal element of the confinement: it should
last from the moment the perpetrator knows the woman is forcibly made
pregnant until the end of the pregnancy (either through miscarriage, birth,
or abortion).55 Cases in which the perpetrator confines a woman until, in
accordance with national laws, she no longer has access to a medical
abortion, could be interpreted as a “confinement.”56
2. The two mental elements of the crime of forced pregnancy
The Rome Statute envisages two mental elements for the crime of
forced pregnancy. The first one, which is present in all other crimes against
humanity, requires that the “perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of
or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack

49. Boon, supra note 13, at 661.
50. The obligation of having a victim who was forcibly made pregnant was primarily to
ensure that the crime of forced pregnancy could not be raised against national laws
controlling abortion under all circumstances. See generally Cate Steains, Gender Issues, in
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 357, 366 (Roy
S. Lee ed., 1999).
51. CTR. FOR INT’L L. RSCH. AND POL’Y, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW GUIDELINES:
LEGAL REQUIREMENTS OF SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE CRIMES 49 (Aleksandra
Sidorenko & Andreja Jerončič eds., 2017).
52. Ongwen, Pre-Trial Decision, supra note 44, at ¶ 99.
53. Boon, supra note 13, at 662; Ongwen, Pre-Trial Decision, supra note 44, at ¶ 2724.
54. C. Buehler, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide, 5 NEMESIS 158,
162 (2002). Note: this is, however, a broad interpretation proposed by Carmela Buehler.
55. Id. Note: other scholars have interpreted confinement without the requirement of any
specific time frame. See MARIA SJÖHOLM, Commentary on Article 7, in COMMENTARY ON
THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 31, 53 (Mark Klamberg ed., 2017).
56. Boon, supra note 13, at 662–63.
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directed against a civilian population.”57 This article does not discuss this
intent further, as it is already widely analyzed and understood.58
The second mental element requires that the perpetrator have confined
one or more women with either “the intent of affecting the ethnic
composition of any population”59 (first intent alternative) or with the intent
of “carrying out other grave violations of international law”60 (the second
intent alternative) – together referred to as “the additional intention.” This
article will examine the two separately, as they are both specific to the
crime of forced pregnancy and found under Article 7(2)(f) of the Rome
Statute.
i. The first intent alternative: “affecting the ethnic composition of
any population”
The first alternative is the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of
any population. It was drafted in the wake of the violations committed in
Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia following the testimonies of the
survivors.61 Reports revealed that during the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia, women were detained until it was too late for them to receive
an abortion.62 Given that the region was in the midst of an ethnic conflict,
it is not surprising that the context and testimonies showed that Serbian
soldiers were driven by the intent of conceiving children who would share
their ethnicity; in other words, children who would have an ethnicity
different from those of their mothers.63
To prove this intent, the prosecutor must establish that the objective of
the perpetrator, when confining the victim(s), was closely related to the
outcome of the pregnancy, and that the victim(s) were confined because the
perpetrator wanted this pregnancy to affect the ethnicity of a particular
group.64 This intent has been interpreted extremely narrowly, restricting the
57. INT’L CRIM. CT., ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 9 (2011) [available at: https://www.icccpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/336923d8-a6ad-40ec-ad7b-45bf9de73d56/0/elementsofcrimeseng.pdf]
(last visited Apr. 4, 2022).
58. See e.g., Art. 7 Common Elements, CASE MATRIX NETWORK,
https://www.casematrixnetwork.org/cmn-knowledge-hub/elements-digest/art-7/commonelements/2/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2022) (compiling the most relevant decisions interpreting
this mental element).
59. INT’L CRIM. CT., supra note 57.
60. Id.
61. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II) (1998) [hereinafter U.N. Diplomatic Conference (1998)].
62. Drake, supra note 13, at 596; Grey, supra note 2, at 919.
63. See Rep. of the Comm’n of Experts, in letter dated May 27, 1994, from the SecretaryGeneral to the President of the Security Council, ¶ 248, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (“During the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia, victims reported that soldiers unequivocally expressed
their intent to give birth to Serbian babies: ‘She was raped almost daily by three or four
soldiers. She was told that she would give birth to a chetnik boy who would kill Muslims
when he grew up.’”).
64. Ongwen Trial Judgment, supra note 43, at ¶ 100.
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crime to cases in which the perpetrator and the victim did not belong to the
same ethnic group.65
ii. The second intent alternative: “carrying out other grave violations of
international law”
The second intent alternative requires that the perpetrator intend to
carry out other grave violations of international law in addition to confining
the victim(s), who, to the perpetrator’s knowledge, had been forcibly made
pregnant.66 It is still unclear, however, what the drafters intended by this
requirement.67 While the Rome Statute does not provide a definition for this
term and little insight is furnished in the preparatory work leading up to the
conference, it does seem that the intent alternative was specifically added
to cover such cases as those crimes committed by Nazis under Nazi rule of
Germany.68 During World War II, women were forcibly made pregnant and
confined by the Nazis with the intent of medical experimentation on both
the pregnant women and the resulting fetuses.69
Unlike the “grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions,” which have
been expressly framed under Article 8(2) of the Rome Statute, what
amounts to a grave violation under Article 7(2)(f) is largely left to the
discretion of judges.70 It does not, however, cover situations where the
perpetrator is acting out of pure sadism or with the sole intent of seriously
violating the victim’s mental or physical integrity. 71
In contrast to the first intent alternative, the Ongwen Trial Judgment
states that the intention of carrying out another grave violation does not
have to be linked to the pregnancy or its outcome per se.72 In other words,
the prosecutor does not have to prove that the perpetrator forced the woman
to become pregnant in order to carry out another grave violation, such as
carrying out medical experimentation specifically on pregnant women,73 to
65.
66.
67.
68.

Boon, supra note 13, at 663.
INT’L CRIM. CT., supra note 57.
Markovic, supra note 13, at 443.
VALERIE OOSTERVELD, Gender-Based Crimes Against Humanity, in FORGING A
CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 78, 91 (Leila Nadya Sadat ed., 2011).
69. Id.; Barbara Bedont & Katherine Hall-Martinez, Ending Impunity for Gender Crimes
Under the International Criminal Court, 6 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 65, 73 (1999).
70. Markovic, supra note 13, at 443. See also Ongwen Pre-Trial Decision, supra note 44,
at ¶ 101 (broadly interpreting the term by stating that grave violations of international law
could include using the victims as his forced wives and to rape, sexually enslave, enslave,
and torture them).
71. COTTIER, ET AL., supra note 47.
72. Ongwen Trial Judgment, supra note 43, at ¶ 2728.
73. “The Holy See aggressively pushed for restricting the boundaries of the forced
pregnancy provision. This included attempts to limit it to the situation in BosniaHerzegovina and to acts with the intent of ethnic cleansing. Such proposals were too
restrictive, however, and would have unduly excluded critical situations such as the
experiences of many Jewish women during World War II. These women were forcibly made
and kept pregnant so that their fetuses could be used for medical experiments. This
submission was rejected through the insertion of the phrase ‘or carrying out other grave
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use the child as a future child soldier, or that the “pregnancy of the woman
[had to be] in any way causally linked to her confinement.”74
Following the court’s interpretation, it would be enough for the
prosecutor to prove, for instance, that the perpetrator confined the victim,
knowing that she was forcibly made pregnant, with the additional intent of
exploiting her as his or her own sex slave or to use her as a forced wife.75
Such confinement and exploitation are both grave violations under
international criminal law.76 While this broader interpretation by the
Ongwen Trial Judgment of the second intent alternative to carry out other
grave violations is welcome, it is problematic that not every confinement
of a forcibly impregnated woman constitutes the crime of forced
pregnancy.
3. The caveat to national law
The last sentence of the definition of the crime of forced pregnancy
specifies that “[t]his definition shall not in any way be interpreted as
affecting national laws relating to pregnancy.”77 While this caveat is an
exceptional addition to the definition of this international crime,78 the
drafting history of the crime of forced pregnancy—and the fact that it was
one of the most difficult to reach an agreement on79—adds to our
understanding of why it was added by the drafters. This exception was a
political compromise80 to reassure states with national laws criminalizing
abortion (including those which criminalize survivors of rape) that they
could not be prosecuted for the crime of forced pregnancy.81
Yet it is still unclear how this caveat should be interpreted, or the legal
effect it will have on the prosecution of this crime. Milan Markovic believes
that it

violations of international law’ into the final definition.” Jessie Soh Sie Eng, Forced
Pregnancy: Codification in the Rome Statute and its Prospect as Implicit Genocide, 4 N.Z.
J. OF PUB. AND INT’L 311, 325 (2006).
74. Ongwen Trial Judgment, supra note 43, at ¶ 99.
75. Id. at ¶101.
76. The crime of sexual slavery is prohibited under art. 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute and
the crime of forced marriage can be charged under art. 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute
(classifying under “other inhumane acts”). See Ongwen Trial Judgment, supra note 43, at ¶
95.
77. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 7(2)(f).
78. There are, in fact, no other international crimes in the Rome Statute referring to the
national laws of states. See Rome Statute, supra note 14.
79. See Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 69, at 73 (stating that the definition of the
crime of forced pregnancy was “the most contentious” issue discussed during the
Diplomatic Conference (1998)).
80. Drake, supra note 13, at 608; Boon, supra note 13, at 637.
81. JOSEPH POWDERLY & NIAMH HAYES, Article 7, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 215 (O. Triffterer eds., 2016); Soh Sie Eng, supra
note 73, at 327.
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suggests that the ICC Statute requires that enormous deference be
given to national abortion laws. Thus, if a crime of forced
pregnancy occurs on the territory of a state where abortion is not
permitted and the confinement is not contrary to the laws of that
state, it will be impossible for the ICC to prosecute the forced
pregnancy.82
Kristen Boon adds that this caveat “shields inconsistent national laws
from the effect of the provision.”83 Certainly, it would be of interest to have
further explanation from the ICC on the concrete effects that this exception
can have on the prosecution of the crime of forced pregnancy as a crime
against humanity.
C. THE ROAD FROM THE ROME STATUTE TO A FUTURE CONVENTION
ON CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

The definition of the crime of forced pregnancy in the Rome Statute
has been criticized as problematic, notably from a gender perspective, by
several scholars. For instance, Milan Markovic expressed concerns about
the caveat to national law.84 Alyson Drake also criticized the requirement
to affect the ethnicity of a group.85 While amending the Rome Statute would
be challenging and could compromise the concept of consistency in ICC
jurisprudence,86 a future convention on the prevention and punishment of
crimes against humanity should not replicate this misstep in defining forced
pregnancy. The following subparts explain the legislative process involved
in the ILC’s submission of the Draft Articles for consideration to the Sixth
Committee of the U.N. from a feminist lens.
1. The genesis of creating a future convention on crimes against
humanity
A group of academics launched the Crimes Against Humanity Initiative
(Initiative) in 2008 to fill a gap in international criminal law: the absence
of a comprehensive and specialized convention on crimes against
humanity.87 They argued that the legislative framework was not broad
enough to protect all victims of mass atrocities and to sanction the
perpetrators of these serious crimes.88 Some scholars focused on the

82. Markovic, supra note 13, at 448.
83. Boon, supra note 13, at 640.
84. Markovic, supra note 13, at 445–48.
85. Drake, supra note 13, at 616–17.
86. MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 28–29 (1996).
87. LEILA. N. SADAT, A Comprehensive History of the Proposed International
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity, in FORGING A
CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 449, 457 (Leila N. Sadat ed., 2011).
88. Sean D. Murphy (Special Rapporteur), First Rep. on Crimes Against Humanity, 6,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/680 (Feb. 17, 2015) [hereinafter ILC, First Report].
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absence of a universally accepted definition of crimes against humanity. 89
Others criticized the specific mandates of the international criminal
tribunals, including their territorial or temporal limitations in prosecuting
crimes against humanity.90
An equally important criticism put forth by the Initiative was the
reliance on the ICC as the sole body to prosecute crimes against humanity.91
While the ICC contributed to the prosecution of these crimes and the
development of jurisprudence under Article 7 of the Rome Statute,92 the
ICC was, and remains, strictly complementary to national legal systems.
Importantly, only half of the world’s population can seek redress under its
current jurisdiction.93 Ultimately, the Initiative aimed to create an “effective
tool of prevention and interstate cooperation and to provide for universal
jurisdiction and state responsibility.”94
For over ten years, the Initiative’s steering committee attempted to
convince members of the international community of the relevance of
having a special convention on crimes against humanity.95 It sought the
technical opinion of more than 200 experts and shared draft versions with
relevant stakeholders, including U.N. Member states and members of civil
society and international organizations.96 In 2014, the Draft Articles
developed by the Initiative were subsequently introduced as a topic to the
program of the ILC.97
2. The decision to keep the definition verbatim for the sake of
consistency
Both the Initiative’s steering committee and the ILC questioned during
their respective drafting processes whether the definition of forced
pregnancy in Article 7 of the Rome Statute was to be replicated in the future

89. SADAT, supra note 87, at 462.
90. GREGORY H. STANTON, Why the World Needs an International Convention on Crimes
Against Humanity, in FORGING A CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 346, at 354
(Leila N. Sadat ed., 2011).
91. STANTON, supra note 90, at 354.
92. See THE WHITNEY R. HARRIS WORLD L. INST., DECLARATION ON THE NEED FOR A
COMPREHENSIVE CONVENTION ON CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (2010) [hereinafter
WASHINGTON DECLARATION].
93. See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icc-cpi.int/
(last visited Apr. 4, 2022) (listing the 123 state parties to the Rome Statute, however,
important political and economic powers such as Russia, China, India, and the United States
are not party signatories).
94. SADAT, supra note 87, at 458.
95. TESSA BOLTON, The Proposed Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes Against Humanity: Developments and Deficiencies, in ON THE PROPOSED CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY CONVENTION 369, 370 (Morten Bergsmo & Song Tianying eds., 2014).
96. See SADAT, supra note 87 (engaging in a comprehensive discussion of the work
conducted for the first proposed convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes
against humanity).
97. G.A. Res. 69/118, at 3 (Dec. 10, 2014).
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convention.98 As Leila Nadya Sadat recalls, it was agreed from the very
first meeting “that the Convention should complement the Rome Statute
for the International Criminal Court.”99
For many experts, it appeared that changing the definition already
(laboriously) negotiated during the Diplomatic Conference (1998) would
be difficult in practice.100 Notably, such a change would go against the
purpose of the future convention, which was “to craft a balanced text that
would prompt states to do better in adopting national laws and national
jurisdiction concerning crimes against humanity … while at the same time
respecting certain limits on what states would likely accept in a new
convention.”101 Approximately 100 states had already implemented the
definition of the Rome Statute in their domestic legislation and would have
to review work that had already been completed.102 Both the Initiative and
the ILC decided to keep the definition verbatim and to accept its
weaknesses.103
According to Lisa Davis, a professor who was part of the worldwide
campaign asking for a modification of the definition of “gender” in the
Draft Articles, the reluctance to make changes stemmed from the belief that
important modification to the language would only undermine the
likelihood of the General Assembly to adopt a convention on crimes against
humanity.104 However, as she rightly adds, “[r]easoning like this has
consistently led to the de-prioritization of gender concerns in conflict, from
sexual and reproductive health care to LGBTQI-tailored responses.”105
The decision to replicate verbatim the definition of the Rome Statute is
regrettable, especially considering the criticisms expressed in the past
twenty years over its lack of gender sensitivity.106 The nation of Estonia
and some non-governmental organizations (NGO), including the Global
Justice Center, have also criticized replication of the definition of the
crimes against humanity in the current Draft Articles.107
98. ILC, First Report, supra note 88, at 6.
99. SADAT, supra note 87, at 458.
100. Id. at 460.
101. Sean D. Murphy, Striking The Right Balance for a Draft Convention on Crimes
Against
Humanity,
JUST
SECURITY
(Sept.
17,
2021),
https://www.justsecurity.org/78257/striking-the-right-balance-for-a-draft-convention-oncrimes-against-humanity/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2022).
102. SADAT, supra note 87, at 463.
103. WASHINGTON DECLARATION, supra note 92, at ¶ 2.
104. Lisa Davis, New Draft of ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ Treaty Affirms Protection for
Women and LGBTIQ Persons. The Fight Wasn’t Easy—and It Isn’t Over Yet, COMMON
DREAMS (June 24, 2018), https://www.commondreams.org/views/2019/06/24/new-draftcrimes-against-humanity-treaty-affirms-protection-women-and-lgbtiq (last visited Apr. 4,
2022).
105. Id.
106. See Markovic, supra note 14; Drake, supra note 13; Boon, supra note 13.
107. Submission to the International Law Commission: The Need to Integrate a GenderPerspective into the Draft Convention on Crimes against Humanity, GLOB. JUST. CTR. (Nov.
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3. The modification of the definition of “gender” as an example of
success
While the decision to leave the definition of forced pregnancy
unchanged did not generate much discussion globally, the ILC did face
criticism with respect to its definition of “gender.”108 This definition also
mirrored that of the Rome Statute.109 It was formally proposed as Draft
Article 3 of the Draft Articles and provisionally adopted during the 77th
Session of the ILC.110
The Draft Articles were submitted to the U.N. Secretary General to be
shared with states, international organizations, and members of civil society
for comments and observations.111 They referred to “gender” as “the two
sexes, male and female, within the context of society.”112 states deemed it
“obsolete,”113 “under-inclusive and inaccurate,”114 “opaque, outdated and
not in line with the recent more inclusive and gender-sensitive definitions
of ‘gender’,”115 and “not reflect[ing] the current international human rights
law.” 116 NGOs, academics, and activists also petitioned against the
definition.117

30, 2018), https://www.globaljusticecenter.net/blog/19-publications/1011-submission-tothe-international-law-commission-the-need-to-integrate-a-gender-perspective-into-thedraft-convention-on-crimes-against-humanity (last visited Apr. 4, 2022); Danielle Hites,
New Crimes Against Humanity Must Not Perpetuate Outdated Definition of Gender,
OPINIOJURIS (Jan. 24, 2019), http://opiniojuris.org/2019/01/24/new-crimes-againsthumanity-treaty-must-not-perpetuate-outdated-definition-of-gender/ (last visited Apr. 4,
2022); Written Contribution of Estonia on the Draft Articles on Crimes Against Humanity,
Memorandum adopted on first reading, Int’l Law Comm’n on Its Sixty-Ninth Session, at 2
(2017) [available at: https://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/71/pdfs/english/cah_estonia.pdf] (last
visited Apr. 4, 2022).
108. MACHTELD BOOT, Article 7, Paragraph 3: Definition of Gender, in COMMENTARY ON
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 159, 273 (Otto Triffterer ed.,
2008).
109. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 7(3).
110. ILC, Fourth Report, supra note 16, at 2.
111. The ILC received an impressive number of responses from the international
community, including responses from about 700 NGOs and individuals, 38 states and 7
international organizations. Id. at 5.
112. Sean D. Murphy (Special Rapporteur), Third Rep. on Crimes Against Humanity, 153,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/704 (Mar. 6, 2017) [hereinafter ILC, Third Report]. See ILC, Fourth
Report, supra note 16.
113. See ILC, Fourth Report, supra note 16, at 33.
114. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Comments and Observations Received from Governments,
International Organizations and Others, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/726, at 33 (2019) [hereinafter
Int’l Law Comm’n Comments].
115. Id. at 32.
116. Id. at 40.
117. See e.g., Gendering the Crimes Against Humanity Treaty–Timeline of Civil Society
Intervention, MADRE, https://www.madre.org/gendering-crimes-against-humanity-treaty
(last visited Apr. 4, 2022) (explaining the work of MADRE, OutRight Action International,
the Human Rights and Gender Justice Clinic of CUNY School of Law, and the Center for
Socio-Legal Research at the Universidad de Los Andes).
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The Special Rapporteur for Crimes Against Humanity, Sean Murphy,
explained that the majority of states, the Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights, and a large number of NGOs and individuals urged the
ILC either to replace the definition or to remove it completely. 118
Regrettably, the ILC chose the latter option, thereby missing an opportunity
to actively incorporate gender sensitivity in international criminal law. 119
Removing the definition completely failed to reflect significant
developments of the past two decades, especially in the field of
international human rights law and the prosecution of sexual and genderbased violence.120
This example of the definition of “gender” illustrates that in some
cases, outdated definitions lacking gender perspective have found their way
into versions of the Draft Articles, despite the time and effort of various
stakeholders in the drafting process. It also shows that such definitions can
change in response to the mobilization of states and civil society.
Similarly, the definition of forced pregnancy should also be modified
in the future convention on crimes against humanity. During its 74th
Session, the Sixth Committee of the U.N. General Assembly took note of
the latest version of the Draft Articles recommended by the ILC and
included a discussion under “crimes against humanity” for its 75th Session
held in the fall of 2020.121 The Sixth Committee must now decide if and
how to elaborate a future convention on crimes against humanity. The
following section proposes that the Sixth Committee should do so, and that
it should also change the definition of forced pregnancy as proposed by the
ILC.

III. THE CRIME OF FORCED PREGNANCY IN THE FUTURE
CONVENTION ON CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY:
GENDER-PERSPECTIVE CRITICISM
Three arguments support modifying the definition of the crime of
forced pregnancy in a future convention on crimes against humanity. First,
the additional intention to alter the ethnicity of a group or to carry out other
118. ILC, Fourth Report, supra note 16, at 34–35.
119. See U.N. GAOR, Int’l Law Comm’n, 71st Sess., 3468th mtg., at 5, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SR.3468, at 5 (2019) (reflecting the new official version of the Draft Articles,
adopted May 2019, without the definition of “gender”).
120. See discussion infra Section 3.3 (analyzing the ILC’s missed opportunity to engage
and synchronize with developments in international human rights law regarding gendermainstreaming and sexual and gender-based violence).
121. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Seventy-First Session, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/74/L.21 (2019). The 75th session of the Sixth Committee of the U.N. General
Assembly was held in 2020. See G.A. Sixth Comm.
on Crimes Against Human., Rep. on Overall Work Program Recommendation by the
Bureau,
U.N.
Doc.
A/76/474
(Nov.
18,
2021)
[available
at:
https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/75/provisional_programme_of_work.pdf] (last visited Apr.
4, 2022).
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grave violations must be removed, given that a main objective of the future
convention should be to enhance accountability for crimes against
humanity. Second, the caveat to national laws must also be removed, as it
serves no purpose in an international criminal law instrument. Third, the
additional intention and the caveat must be removed, as they do not align
with developments of international human rights law and the growing
recognition that international instruments should be drafted in accordance
with gender-sensitive practices. Each argument is examined in turn in the
following subpart.
A. THE ADDITIONAL INTENTION OF THE PERPETRATOR
In order to successfully prosecute any crime against humanity in the
Rome Statute, the Office of the Prosecutor must prove that the perpetrator
had the knowledge that the conduct was part of, or the intention that it be
part of, a “widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian
population.”122 The crime of forced pregnancy, in contrast to all other
crimes of sexual violence, also requires an additional intention either to
affect the ethnic composition of a group or to carry out other grave
violations of international law.123
This additional intent requirement fosters gender biases and
institutionalizes sexist behavior against women and girls in the field of
international criminal law,124 and should therefore be removed from the
future convention. This subpart explains why the first intent alternative
(i.e., to modify the ethnic composition of a group) affects the status of
women as victims in their own rights. It then shows how the second intent
alternative (i.e., the intent to commit other grave violations of international
law) perpetuates the incorrect presumption that reproductive violence is a
crime of ‘lesser’ gravity that cannot be prosecuted independently.
1. The intention of affecting the ethnic composition of any population
The first alternative for the Office of the Prosecutor to successfully
prosecute forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity under the Rome
Statute is to prove that the perpetrator wanted to affect the ethnic
composition of a group.125 This additional requirement, however, has a
pervasive effect. First, it maintains a lack of accountability for sexual and
gender-based crimes. Second, it perpetuates the idea that the rights of
women must be considered not through the harm done to their sexual
autonomy and body integrity, but rather to the ‘honor’ of the community to
122. See Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 7(1)(g)-4, ¶ 3.
123. See id. at arts. 7 (1) (g)-1–6).
124. Louise Chappell, Conflicting Institutions and the Search for Gender Justice at the
International Criminal Court, 67 POL. RSCH. Q. 183, 185 (2014); INTER-AM. COMM’N ON
HUM. RTS., ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR WOMEN VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN MESOAMERICA
14 (2011).
125. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 7(2)(f).
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which they belong. Finally, this first intent alternative also blurs the identity
of the legal subject protected under this crime.
i. The limitation to the fight against impunity
The first intent alternative limits the prosecution of reproductive
violence at the international level to a very specific situation: when the
perpetrator does not have the same ethnicity as his or her victim. The crime
of forced pregnancy thus cannot be committed against members of the same
ethnic group.126 Narrowing the crime in such a way is at odds with a future
convention that is explicitly aimed at enhancing the prosecution of crimes
against humanity.127 This limitation defeats the very purpose of such a
convention. It also fails to focus on the very essence of the crime of forced
pregnancy, namely the violation of the reproductive rights of women, 128
regardless of their ethnicity or the ethnicity of their perpetrators.
These limitations of the first intent alternative were highlighted
following a request of the International Co-Prosecutors to open an
investigation for the crime of forced pregnancy allegedly committed in
Cambodia between 1975 and 1979.129 The International Co-Prosecutors
wanted to open an investigation under Article 5 of the Law on the
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
(ECCC) concerning “other inhuman acts.”130 The prosecutors relied heavily
on the definition of the Rome Statute since it represented the “common
understanding under international law” of the crime of forced pregnancy.131
In addition, since Article 9 of the Agreement between the U.N. and the
Royal Government of Cambodia provided that the ECCC’s jurisdiction
included crimes against humanity as defined in the Rome Statute,132 then it
followed the ECCC could interpret the definition of forced pregnancy under
Article 7(2)(f) of the Rome Statute.
In a 2016 decision, the Office of the Co-Investigating Judges of the
ECCC held that a finding of intent to modify the ethnic composition of a
group was fact-specific and aimed at responding to a particular set of
126. Id.
127. Draft Articles, supra note 15 (“Determined to put an end to impunity for the
perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.”); ILC,
First Report, supra note 88, at 11.
128. See Ongwen Trial Judgment, supra note 43, at ¶ 99 (“It is apparent that the essence
of the crime of forced pregnancy is in unlawfully placing the victim in a position in which
she cannot choose whether to continue the pregnancy.”).
129. Co-Prosecutor v. Ao, Case No. 004/07-09-2009-ECCC-OCIJ, Consolidated Decision
on the Request for Investigative Action Concerning the Crime of Forced Pregnancy and
Forced Impregnation, ¶ 13 (Extraordinary Chambers in the Cts. of Cambodia June 13, 2016)
[hereinafter Case 004, ECCC].
130. Id. at ¶ 20.
131. See id. (lending further support from the fact that the definition of the crime of forced
pregnancy in the Rome Statute was also mirrored in the Statute of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone).
132. Id. at ¶ 67.
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circumstances, namely the grave violations committed against women and
girls in Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina.133 The ECCC expressly
noted that the “additional intent to change the ethnic composition of the
population [was] unlikely to be met by the factual circumstances relevant
to forced pregnancy during the [Democratic Kampuchea] regime [in
Cambodia]”134—explicitly acknowledging the occurrence of forced
pregnancies between 1975 and 1979.
However, the ECCC dismissed the possibility of opening an
investigation, because the circumstances in Cambodia did not meet the
restrictive intent to modify the ethnic composition of a group as provided
under the Rome Statute’s definition.135 The ECCC was shown clear
evidence that, during the Democratic Kampuchea regime, couples from the
same ethnicity were forced to have sexual relations and women were forced
to bring their pregnancies to term in accordance with the strategy of the
regime to increase the Cambodian population.136
This example demonstrates how this definition of the crime of forced
pregnancy fails victims. Despite evidence that Cambodian women were
subject to forced pregnancies, the Court did not have jurisdiction because
there was no finding of an intent to change the ethnic composition of the
Cambodian population. As it stands, the first intent alternative frames the
crime of forced pregnancy through a lens that fails to be gender sensitive.137
ii. The protection of human rights of women
The first intent alternative impedes the progress already achieved in
recognizing the rights of women as individual human rights. At the time of
the Diplomatic Conference (1998), violence against women was already
described as being “among the most serious and pervasive human rights
abuses that the international community confronts.”138 The discussions in
the preparatory work leading up to the conference highlight the eagerness
of the drafters to recognize the human rights of women and to address the
situation.139
One of the goals was thus to create an international criminal institution
that could effectively combat and prosecute sexual and gender-based

133. Id. at ¶ 69.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. Id.
136. Case 004, ECCC, supra note 129, at 119.
137. Chappell, supra note 37, at 6.
138. HUM. RTS. WATCH, Women’s Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD
REPORT
(1998)
[available
at:
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport/Back04.htm#P643_128126] (last visited Apr. 4, 2022).
139. See U.N. Diplomatic Conference (1998), supra note 61, at 120, 112 (statements of
the Observer for the Asian Centre for Women’s Human Rights and the Observer for the
U.N. Children’s Fund, respectively).
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crimes.140 However, the requirement of proof of an additional intent of the
perpetrator to modify the ethnicity of a group significantly diminished the
potential of success for prosecuting forced pregnancy as a crime against
humanity on its own.141 It ultimately affected the potential to develop a new
gender-sensitive jurisprudence in which the human rights of women,
especially their reproductive rights, would be at the focus.
This first intent alternative also dismisses the experience of women as
the primary victims of this crime and fails to protect their rights. After all,
they are the ones who have been confined and forced to bear a child, with
irremediable psychological and physical effects resulting from this
exploitation.142 The legal focus should thus be placed on the protection of
their reproductive rights, instead of on the impact the crime of forced
pregnancy might have on the demographic composition of an ethnic group.
In focusing on the effect on the ethnic composition of a group, the
experience of women who are victims of forced pregnancy is cast aside,
encouraging the traditional view of international jurisprudence that women
are legal subjects belonging to someone else, rather than individual persons.
143

This additional mental element fails to address the root causes of the
issue of forced pregnancy and the fact that institutionalized gender
imbalance has historically led to the violation of the rights of women.144 It
fosters what has been heavily criticized, both in the fields of international
criminal law and of international humanitarian law, as structural
domination, confining women who are victims of grave violations to their
roles as mothers, wives, and members of a community. 145 The Rome Statute
did not perpetuate the patriarchal language that was first used to define the
harm done to women.146 However, in adopting it, it failed to recognize

140. U.N. Diplomatic Conference (1998), supra note 61, at 65, 100, 107 (statements of
Norway, New Zealand, and Bangladesh, respectively). See also Khadija Ali, Sexual and
Gender Based Crimes in International Criminal Law: Moving Forwards or Backwards?, 9
INT’L J. OF L. AND POL. SCI. 3619, 3621 (2015).
141. Drake, supra note 13, at 616.
142. U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/57 (2016).
143. F.N. Aolain, Sex-Based Violence and the Holocaust–A Reevaluation of Harms and
Rights in International Law, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 43, 78–79 (2000); Boon, supra note
13, at 632.
144. Chinkin, supra note 20, at 16; THE U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN, ITS CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 23, at 48.
145. Ali, supra note 140, at 3619.
146. In comparison, for instance, to the language used in the Geneva Convention which
prohibits outrage upon personal dignity. See DIANNE OTTO, Lost in Translation: ReScripting the Sexed Subjects of International Human Rights Law, in INT’L L. & ITS OTHERS
318, 322 (A. Orford ed., 2006). Another example is the provision on family honor and rights
in The Hague Regulations of 1907 which implicitly prohibit violence against women. Id.
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women as full legal agents of their own.147 A future convention on crimes
against humanity should not repeat the same mistake.
iii. The legal subject individually protected under the crime
The first intent alternative to modify the ethnicity of the group
diminishes the protection of women. It raises the question: Is the crime
against humanity of forced pregnancy aimed at protecting the victim of
forcible maternity? Or is it rather directed at protecting the group to which
she belongs?148
At its inception, the crime of forced pregnancy was unequivocally
intended to protect women’s rights. The Vienna Declaration described
forced pregnancy as “violations of the human rights of women in situations
of armed conflict,”149 while the Beijing Declaration clearly addressed the
issue as being one of gender and not of ethnicity.150
This relationship between forcible maternity and ethnicity only
appeared during the drafting of the Rome Statute, when the crime was
linked to the violations committed in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.151
In doing so, the drafters of the Rome Statute brought together the protection
of the reproductive rights of women with the protection of the ethnicity of
the group to which they belonged. This change overlooked the central role
of women as the primary victims of the crime.152
This additional mental element to modify the ethnic composition of a
group does not comport with the definition of crimes against humanity; it
more closely resembles the definition of genocide. Crimes against
humanity encompass a broader range of crimes, which do not require the
specific intent to discriminate against a specific ethnic group.153 Only the
crime of persecution requires such a discriminatory intent.154
The intent to affect the ethnicity of the group is even harder to
understand when no other sexual or gender-based crime defined as a crime
against humanity requires such an intent. It is true that crimes against
147. Charlesworth, supra note 26, at 387.
148. Drake, supra note 13, at 597.
149. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,
¶ 38, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (June 25, 1993) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Vienna
Declaration].
150. Beijing Declaration, supra note 1, at ¶ 142(c) (emphasis added).
151. In fact, the first draft of the Rome Statute did not mention any specific definition of
forced pregnancy. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, Report of the Preparatory Commission on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2 (Apr. 14,
1998). See also, U.N. Diplomatic Conference (1998), supra note 61, at 162.
152. Drake, supra note 13, at 616.
153. William A. Schabas, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and Darfur: The
Commission of Inquiry’s Findings on Genocide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1703,1716–17
(2006); See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), 2015, I.C.J. Rep., U.N. Sales No. 1077.
154. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 7(1).
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humanity may often represent early warning signs of genocidal intent.155
Targeting the ethnic composition of a group, however, is not generally the
main purpose of perpetrators of crimes against humanity. As William
Schabas states, “[c]rimes against humanity can be used to describe a much
broader range of atrocities, involving violence against the person and
persecution, that fall short of physical destruction of a group.”156 For this
reason, the definition of the crime of forced pregnancy should focus
exclusively on the forcible impregnation and confinement of a woman—
regardless of her ethnic group—and to prove that the perpetrator knew that
this act was part of a widespread or systematic attack.
If any intent should be considered part of the crime of forced
pregnancy, it should be that the perpetrator intended “an assault on the
reproductive self-determination of women”157 and “to mark rape and the
rapist upon the woman’s body and upon the woman’s life.”158 This is
unfortunately not the case under the current definition. The requirement to
prove an intention to destroy a community is uncalled for and diminishes
the grave violations of women’s physical and mental integrity that this
crime really represents. Therefore, it should be removed from the definition
of a future convention.
2. The intention to carry out other grave violations of international law
The first intent alternative to affect the “ethnic composition of any
population” was added by the drafters of the Rome Statute as a response to
crimes committed during the conflicts in Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia.159 Some states explained that the crime of forced pregnancy
could also occur in circumstances other than an ethnic cleansing and should
thus not be restricted to this context exclusively.160 Feminist critics and the
Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice also lobbied during the Diplomatic
Conference (1998) to put an end to impunity for reproductive
violence161 and for the definition not to be limited to situations closely
related to ethnic cleansing.162

155. STANTON, supra note 90, at 349.
156. Schabas, supra note 153, at 1716–17 (emphasis added); Boon, supra note 13, at 663.
157. Copelon, supra note 20, at 263.
158. Id.
159. U.N. Diplomatic Conference (1998), supra note 61, at 161.
160. Grey, supra note 2, at 920; Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 69, at 74.
161. Women Caucus Advocacy in ICC Negotiations: The Crime of ‘Forced Pregnancy,’
WOMEN’S
CAUCUS
FOR
GENDER
JUST.
(June
26,
1998),
http://iccwomen.org/wigjdraft1/Archives/oldWCGJ/icc/iccpc/rome/forcedpreg.html (last
visited Apr. 4, 2022).
162. See Dorean M. Koenig & Kelly D. Askin, International Criminal Law and the
International Criminal Court Statute: Crimes Against Women, 2 WOMEN AND INT’L HUM.
RTS. L. 3, 15–16 (1999); Grey, supra note 2, at 921–922; Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra
note 69, at 72–73.
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Accordingly, the solution to expand the definition was the addition of
the mental element of “carrying out other grave violations of international
law” to the crime of forced pregnancy.163 This represented a compromise
between the states that wanted to ensure that reproductive violence would
be included in the Rome Statute and those that feared an overly broad
definition.164
While the purpose of broadening the intention is welcome, its effect is
not. Requiring this intention first reduces the crime of forced pregnancy to
a “lesser” crime, which must include the intention to perpetrate other grave
violations of international law. It signals the crime is not considered
egregious enough to be worth prosecuting on its own. This second intent
alternative further perpetuates the idea that, under international criminal
law, sexual and gender-based crimes are not a priority on the prosecutor’s
agenda.
i. The disregard of the experience of victims
Far from being objective, the second intent alternative reflects
gendered biases and perpetuates a male-dominant viewpoint of
international law, which has traditionally disregarded the experience of
women in policymaking.165 For one, the definition of the crime does not
accurately take into account the harm suffered by the victims of this crime.
It still gives the negative impression that forcing a woman to be pregnant,
even when conducted in a widespread and systematic manner, is not a
violation serious enough to be prosecuted on its own. It indicates that
international law remains unable to effectively protect the rights of
women,166 since even such a core violation of the reproductive rights of
women is not in itself considered a “grave violation.”167
Moreover, the definition disregards the direct consequences that a
forced pregnancy has on the autonomy of a woman and on her dignity.
Confining a forcibly impregnated woman violates the bodily dignity and
mental integrity of that person, which are two fundamental rights.168 In

163. Drake, supra note 13, at 598.
164. Grey, supra note 2, at 921–22; Boon, supra note 13, at 666.
165. Chappell, supra note 124, at 185.
166. The Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice tried to mainstream gender during the
drafting process of the Rome Statute to overcome the incapacity of international
humanitarian law to effectively protect women. Pam Spees, Women’s Advocacy in the
Creation of the International Criminal Court: Changing the Landscapes of Justice and
Power, 28(4) SIGNS 1233, 1239 (2003). The group wanted to make sure that the gravity of
sexual and gender-based violence would be fully recognized and prosecuted under
international criminal law. Id.
167. Boon, supra note 13, at 627.
168. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted Dec. 16, 1966, S.
Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1987), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). See
also U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment 20 on Article 7, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994). Int’l Law Comm’n Comments, supra note 114, at 33.
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addition, the definition overlooks the physical and mental harm a forced
pregnancy has on the victim practically. An unwanted pregnancy can have
extremely damaging long-term effects on the physical and mental health of
a woman.169 A confinement can lead to “morbidity and ill-health, as well
as negative mental health outcomes.”170
The physical and mental harms caused by the act of forcing a woman
to bear a child are far more severe than those caused by other crimes against
humanity. For instance, the effects of forced pregnancy share similarities
with the effects caused by torture,171 which is also prohibited under
Article 7(1)(f) of the Rome Statute.172 The Special Rapporteur on torture
and ill-treatment, Juan Méndez, reported that the Committee Against
Torture had been concerned about restrictive access to reproductive rights,
including the right to abortion, because the denial of reproductive health
causes “tremendous and lasting physical and emotional suffering inflicted
on the basis of gender.”173
For these reasons, the crime of forced pregnancy should be in and of
itself a grave violation of international law and should not require the
additional intent of “carrying out other grave violations of international
law.”174 This second intent alternative should be removed from a future
convention on crimes against humanity.
ii. Fostering the belief that sexual violence is not worth being
prosecuted
“I’ve got ten dead bodies; how do I have time for rape? That’s not as
important.” 175 This comment is an example of the type of comments that
were made by some members of the investigating team in the early years
of the ICTY. 176 This example from the 1990s demonstrates how sexual
crimes were considered to be lesser crimes by members of the investigation
and prosecution team. At that time, sexual violence was not deemed a
priority, but rather viewed as an inevitability of war.177 Fortunately, the case
law of certain ad hoc tribunals later changed this stereotype and adopted a

169. Grey, supra note 2, at 928.
170. U.N. Secretary-General, Rights of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest
Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. A/66/254 (Aug. 3,
2011).
171. Juan E. Méndez (Special Rapporteur), Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ¶ 50, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/22/53 (Feb. 1, 2013).
172. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 7(1)(f).
173. Id. These concerns were also shared by the U.N. Human Rights Council. U.N. Hum.
Rts. Council, General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, ¶ 8 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36, (2018).
174. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 7(2)(g).
175. Kuo, supra note 32, at 310–11.
176. Id.
177. Boon, supra note 13, at 628.
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gender-sensitive approach for the first time in the history of international
criminal law.178
This article recognizes the support the Rome Statute has provided in
the fight against impunity for sexual crimes over the past two decades and
the support it still provides today. 179 Yet it is difficult to comprehend why
the crime of forced pregnancy, as part of all the crimes against humanity
listed in Article 7 of the Statute, is the only one requiring a higher level of
intent.180 To mirror its definition of forced pregnancy in a future convention
would entrench the perception that violations of the reproductive rights of
women are not “grave” enough to be prosecuted in an international criminal
legal forum without an additional intention to carry out another violation.181
A gender-sensitive approach shows that this crime represents a grave
“assault on the reproductive self-determination of women,”182 and this
grave violation of human rights should be reflected in the definition of the
crime.
As confirmed by the Ongwen Trial Judgment when examining the
crime of forced pregnancy, however, the second intent alternative is a
prerequisite to the crime of forced pregnancy.183 While this case represents
an important precedent and may encourage new prosecutions of the crime
in the future,184 the ruling of the Chamber reveals weaknesses of the
definition. Given the current definition in the Rome Statute, the judges of
the Ongwen Trial Judgment could not conclude that placing women who
become pregnant as a result of rape under close surveillance185 and
therefore could not give them the free choice to decide whether to continue
their pregnancy could itself constitute a grave violation of international
law.186 In order to do so the prosecutor had to have successfully proven that
Mr. Ongwen also intended to submit these women to other violations of
human rights—including the crimes of forced marriage, torture, rape, or
sexual slavery.187
In short, a direct violation of the reproductive rights of women would
not represent a grave violation of international criminal law based on the
definition in the Rome Statute and its subsequent interpretation by the
Ongwen Trial Judgment. If the alleged perpetrators did not intend to use
women as their forced wives, did not intend to rape them, did not intend to
178. See also Copelon, supra note 20, at 247.
179. See, for instance, the landmark decisions of the ICC regarding sexual and genderbased violence. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Judgment, (July 8,
2019); Al Hassan case, ICC, supra note 11.
180. Drake, supra note 13, at 619.
181. Grey, supra note 3, at 915.
182. Copelon, supra note 20, at 263.
183. Ongwen Trial Judgment, supra note 43, at ¶ 101.
184. Grey, supra note 2, at 930.
185. Ongwen Trial Judgment, supra note 43, at ¶ 3058.
186. Ongwen, Pre-Trial Judgment, supra note 44, at ¶ 99.
187. Ongwen Trial Judgment, supra note 43, at ¶ 3061.
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enslave them (with or without a sexual component), or did not intend to
torture them, the victims would be unlikely to succeed in bringing forth
forced pregnancy charges.188
This interpretation fosters the idea that reproductive violence cannot be
prosecuted on its own. Instead of encouraging the prosecution of the crime
of forced pregnancy, the requirement to prove that the perpetrator had the
intent of committing another grave violation encourages victims to bring
cases of forced pregnancies as the aggravating consequences of another
grave violation.
This path was taken in the Brima case at the Special Court for Sierra
Leone.189 In this case, women, so-called “bush wives,” were forced to
marry rebels and to conduct domestic chores for them while being
repeatedly sexually abused.190 Pregnant victims were then prevented from
getting abortions.191 Despite clear evidence of forced pregnancies, the
prosecution decided not to raise charges for this crime (as prohibited in
Article 2(g) of the Special Court for Sierra Leone Statute).192 Rather, the
fact that women were forcibly made pregnant was deemed to be an inherent
consequence of forced marriage or sexual slavery.193
As a consequence of this case and others, prosecutions and sanctions
for the crime of forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity have been
largely missing from the jurisprudence of international tribunals.194 This
can be partially explained by the legal gap in the constitutive statutes of
these international tribunals, which do not expressly prohibit this crime.195
Another reason for this exclusion is that crimes related to reproductive

188. Id. at ¶ 2726.
189. Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment (June 20, 2007).
190. Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Concurring Opinion of Judge
Sebutinde (June 20, 2007).
191. Prosecutor v. Brima, supra note 190, at ¶¶ 1080–1081.
192. Id.
193. Id. at ¶ 1114. See also Prosecutor v. Brima, supra note 189, at ¶ 579; Prosecutor v.
Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Justice Doherty on Count 7
(Sexual Slavery) and Count 8 (Forced Marriages), ¶ 587 (June 20, 2007) (considering the
constant sexual abuses of the bush wives, including the forced pregnancies, as an inherent
component of forced marriages).
194. See discussion supra note 2.
195. In fact, the 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter),
the 1946 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Charter), the
1993 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (and its
updated version of 2009), and the 1994 Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda do
not prohibit the crime of forced pregnancy. See e.g., Prosecutor v. Gagovic, Case No. IT96-23, Indictment, ¶¶ 9.3, 9.13 (June 18, 1996); Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case Nos. IT-955-R61 & IT-95-18-R61, Review of Indictments, ¶ 94 (June 27, 1996). Hence, victims of
forced pregnancies had to be content with a mere acknowledgement from the Prosecutor
that such crimes had been committed against them, without the possibility of raising charges.
Id.
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violence have been rarely prosecuted on their own.196 To avoid this
situation, the new convention should not require a separate intent to commit
other grave violations, and should instead encourage the prosecution of the
crime independently.
The shortcomings of the current definition of the crime are thus
apparent. Criminal courts and tribunals have been reluctant to either
investigate or prosecute forced pregnancy as a separate offense from
another grave violation. This situation has created a culture of impunity,
leaving an important gap in which perpetrators of reproductive violence
have not been sanctioned for their crimes, despite evidence of the
increasing occurrence of these crimes.197 The concern of feminist groups
that the current definition would create a crime “for which accountability
could be easily avoided by utilizing loopholes,”198 and for which “the
qualifications on gender-based crimes would create confusion and
complications within the court when victims sought redress,”199 has
unfortunately materialized.
For the above reasons, the additional intent “of affecting the ethnic
composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of
international law”200 should be removed from the definition of a future
convention on crimes against humanity. Women activists advocated in the
late 1990s for a definition of the crime of rape that would better reflect the
harm caused to women and insisted that “rape is an atrocity whatever the
purpose.”201 The same holds true here: forced pregnancy is an atrocity,
whatever additional intent the perpetrator may have had.
B. THE CAVEAT TO NATIONAL LAW
The definition of forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity was
also criticized for the caveat added at the very end of Article 7(2)(f) of the
Rome Statute (and again mirrored in the Draft Articles proposed by the
ILC), which states that “[t]his definition [of forced pregnancy] shall not in
any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy.”202
196. As rightfully stated by Dieneke De Vos, “[h]istorically, however, there have only
been few instances where such violence has been independently recognized and considered.
This left reproductive violence relatively invisible in international law. Nonetheless, current
developments reflect a growing recognition that reproductive violence constitutes a distinct
form of violence that should be independently recognized as violating specific, individual
rights and may also constitute (international) crimes in certain circumstances.” De Vos,
supra note 2.
197. See e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, “WE’LL KILL YOU IF YOU CRY”: SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN
THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT 40 (2003); SHUBIN, supra note 9, at 9–10; LADISCH, supra note
2; U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., supra note 9; U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, supra note 7.
198. SHUBIN, supra note 9, at 8–9.
199. Id. at 9.
200. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 7(2)(f).
201. Rhonda Copelon, Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes Against
Women into International Criminal Law, 46 MCGILL L.J. 217, 223 (2000).
202. Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 7(2)(f).
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First, this part criticizes the unjustifiable fears of certain states, which have
created a definition of a crime that perpetuates patriarchal patterns and
disrespects the reproductive rights of women. Second, it argues that this
reference to domestic legislation does not reflect the spirit of the Statute
(and international criminal law more generally) and subjects the
reproductive rights of women to cultural relativism.
1. The unrelated (and unjustified) discussion about abortion
The definition of the crime of forced pregnancy in the Rome Statute
was drafted to secure a compromise between the states participating in the
Diplomatic Conference (1998), and thus, in its final version, it ultimately
failed to protect women against human rights violations.203 Certain likeminded states and the Holy See (i.e. the Vatican) were openly against
reproductive choices for women, and saw in the codification of the crime
of forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity a possible threat to
national laws prohibiting abortion or other forms of contraception.204
However, as was pointed out by the Women’s Caucus for Gender
Justice and reiterated twenty years later by the Global Justice Center, there
is no reason under international criminal law to link the crime of forced
pregnancy—which is a severe violation of body integrity and autonomy of
women—to domestic laws regulating abortion.205 States with national
legislation on the termination of pregnancy are not per se violating
international criminal law,206 and any reference to that national legislation
should have been discarded or deemed irrelevant.
Rather, only an approach to the fundamental rights of women lacking
in gender sensitivity could lead to an exception shielding the legislation of
states inconsistent with the prohibition of committing the heinous act of
confining a woman forcibly made pregnant to carry a child against her
will.207 This concession in favor of national legislation for a crime that only
affects women shows how patriarchal mentalities have dominated the

203. See Boon, supra note 13, at 666.
204. U.N. Diplomatic Conference (1998), supra note 61, at 148, 160, 163, 166 (statements
of Saudi Arabia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Islamic Republic of Iran, respectively).
205. Women Caucus Advocacy in ICC Negotiations: The Crime of ‘Forced Pregnancy,’
supra note 143; GLOBAL JUST. CTR., SUBMISSION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION:
THE NEED TO INTEGRATE A GENDER-PERSPECTIVE INTO THE DRAFT CONVENTION ON CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY 6 (2018) [available at: https://www.globaljusticecenter.net/blog/19publications/1011-submission-to-the-international-law-commission-the-need-to-integratea-gender-perspective-into-the-draft-convention-on-crimes-against-humanity] (last visited
Apr. 4, 2021).
206. The Rome Statute’s Preamble only provides for the importance of prosecuting the
“most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.” Rome Statute,
supra note 14. The ones that have “threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world.”
Id. Accordingly, a national law preventing abortion in some circumstances would not
necessarily fall within the realm of international criminal law.
207. Markovic, supra note 13, at 447–48. Boon, supra note 13, at 639–40.
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development of international criminal law generally208 and influenced the
drafting of the Rome Statute specifically.
Significantly, a parallel can be made between how the crime of rape
was first conceptualized (i.e., as a crime against the “honor” of the family,
not a crime of physical violence against the victim209) and how the crime of
forced pregnancy was framed in 1998 by considering national laws on
abortion.210 In both cases, the individual rights of women were overlooked
to give precedence to concerns that were not directly articulated in relation
to the physical211 and mental harms212 of the victims themselves. As was
remarked upon by the representative of Jordan during the U.N. Diplomatic
Conference (1998), “abortion was not the issue [in the discussion]; to force
a woman to bear the child of a rapist was torture in extreme form and should
be included as a crime against humanity.”213
The crime of forced pregnancy does not extend only to situations in
which the pregnancy is the result of a rape. The ICC was created to
prosecute the most egregious crimes, and to accept that an exception could
be made for the crime of forced pregnancy to consider domestic laws
encourages impunity. It also ignores the impact that sexual and genderbased crimes have on victims.
2. The rejection of cultural relativism under international criminal law
The explicit exception regarding the national legislation of states opens
the door to cultural relativism214 and raises concerns about how gendersensitive approaches can be integrated into international criminal law
regarding sexual and reproductive violence against women. First, the
inclusion of this caveat contrasts other crimes prohibited by the Rome
Statute, which do not make any reference to national laws.215 Second, it
208. See Askin, supra note 162, at 295. In her analysis, Askin reviews the lack of
references that were made to women in international criminal law documents prior to the
creation of the Rome Statute. She concludes that “primarily men neglected to enumerate,
condemn, and prosecute these [sexual and gender-based] crimes.” Id.
209. Copelon, supra note 20, at 249.
210. The caveat refers to “national laws relating to pregnancy.” Rome Statute, supra note
14, at art. 7(2)(f).
211. See e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 7(2)(e). The crime of torture which is
defined as the “intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused.”
212. Id.
213. U.N. Diplomatic Conference (1998), supra note 61, at 332.
214. Cultural relativism is defined as “[t]he position that there is no universal standard to
measure cultures by and that all cultures are equally valid and must be understood in their
own
terms.”
Cultural
Relativism,
OXFORD
REFERENCE,
https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095652905
(last
visited Apr. 4, 2022).
215. As rightfully stated by Milan Markovic, “[t]his apparent deference given to national
law in forced pregnancy prosecutions is in stark contrast to how other crimes are prosecuted
by the ICC. As a general matter, the ICC will only apply domestic law as a last resort and
after having examined the ICC Statute and international materials. A worrying possibility is
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compels the ICC to evaluate whether the defendant acted in violation of his
or her own domestic laws, creating a “‘state action’ exception in forced
pregnancy cases.”216 Finally, and most importantly, like-minded states
proposed a definition of crimes against humanity that would take into
account cultural, religious, and legal differences.217 However, their
proposition was rejected during the discussions218 because states wanted to
prevent the integration of cultural relativism into the provisions of the
Statute.219
In the words of the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC, “[t]he international
community has declared itself in favor of a right to crimes against humanity
that would be the same for all humanity.”220 Unfortunately, the voices of a
few states and the Holy See—which did not accept autonomous
reproductive rights for women primarily for cultural and religious
reasons—were heard at the expense of the fundamental rights of women.221
These reasons might have some cultural or religious values; however, these
are exactly the same values intrinsically linked to cultural relativism that
were rejected in the Statute in the first place.222 These values should not
have influenced the legislative process, which had the explicit purpose of
prohibiting the “most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole.”223
While international criminal law should sometimes consider
multiculturalism and find compromises between states with different
beliefs,224 specific references to national laws are completely unnecessary.
In response to the fear expressed by several states that an activist court
could be too progressive or could attempt to impose “Western standards”
on their national laws,225 the drafters of the Rome Statute made it
unequivocal that the ICC would play a complementarity role to national
that the ICC might have to apply national abortion laws even when they are fundamentally
discriminatory or sexist.” Markovic, supra note 13, at 448.
216. Id. at 447.
217. Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, and United Arab Emirates, Proposal
Concerning
the
Elements
of Crimes
Against
Humanity,
U.N.
Doc
PCNICC/1999/WGEC/DP.39 (Dec. 3, 1999).
218. DARRYL ROBINSON, The Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE 57, 67–68 (Roy S. Lee & Hakan Friman eds., 2001).
219. Id. at 68.
220. « La communauté internationale s’est prononcée en faveur d’un même droit des
crimes contre l’humanité pour toute l’humanité » (author’s translation). Al Hassan case,
ICC, supra note 11, at ¶ 181.
221. Boon, supra note 13, at 666. See also Markovic, supra note 13, at 448.
222. Robinson, supra note 218, at 68.
223. U.N. Secretary-General, Preamble, in Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998).
224. Steains, supra note 50, at 365–69.
225. U.N. Diplomatic Conference (1998), supra note 61, at 116, 117 (statements of Iraq
and Yemen, respectively). See also Robinson, supra note 218, at 69.
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jurisdiction.226 Thus, there is no reason that explains why the caveat to
national law was included in the definition. This caveat concedes that
national laws on reproductive rights can (and will) trump the obligations
that states have under international criminal law regarding this crime.227
Given this exception, the crime of forced pregnancy, which primarily
affects women who were absent from the negotiations table in the 1990s,
seemingly does not offer the same level of protection as the other crimes
found under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, which concern both men and
women.228 This caveat should thus be removed from a future convention on
crimes against humanity, because the direct violation of fundamental rights
of women should not be permitted under any circumstances.
C. THE LACK OF HARMONIZATION WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW

The strong criticisms expressed by states, international organizations,
and NGOs on the definition of “gender” in the proposed articles of the ILC
apply equally to the definition of forced pregnancy.229 Most of these
comments pointed out that the definition of “gender” did not take “into
consideration the developments of the last twenty years in the areas of
international human rights law and international criminal law, particularly
regarding sexual and gender-based crimes.”230
The same holds true for the definition of the crime of forced pregnancy,
which should be modified to better reflect the state of international law
today. More precisely, this subpart first argues that international criminal
law should be harmonized with the advancement and wide recognition of
the rights of women, including their reproductive rights, as supported by
international human rights law. Second, this subpart highlights the critical
importance of gender mainstreaming. Lastly, this subpart explains the
reasons why gender mainstreaming and the advancement of women’s rights
should be considered in the definition of the crime of forced pregnancy in
a future convention on crimes against humanity.
1. The recognition of reproductive rights in international human rights
law
The crime of forced pregnancy proved to be one of the most
controversial crimes to define during the Diplomatic Conference (1998),
because certain states feared it would affect their national laws.231 These
concerns transformed the definition of this crime into a political and
226. The Preamble of the Rome Statute emphasizes that the ICC will act be
complementary to national criminal jurisdiction. Rome Statute, supra note 14.
227. Markovic, supra note 13, at 447.
228. Soh Sie Eng, supra note 73, at 327.
229. See ILC, Fourth Report, supra note 16, at 32–37.
230. Int’l Law Comm’n Comments, supra note 114, at 31 (statement of Belgium).
231. Ongwen Trial Judgment, supra note 43, at ¶ 2718.
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cultural compromise. Instead, there should have been a real attempt from
the international community to address violations of international human
rights law, especially regarding the impact forced pregnancies have on
women.232 States should be reminded of their duty, “regardless of their
political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human
rights and fundamental freedoms.”233 The Sixth Committee of the General
Assembly should not forget this obligation when shaping and drafting a
future convention on crimes against humanity.
It could be argued that the definition in the Rome Statute is the result
of an absence of recognition under international human rights law of
reproductive rights as fundamental rights at the time of the Diplomatic
Conference (1998). This argument, however, cannot be raised today.
Reproductive rights are now understood to be human rights.234 As such,
they deserve the same level of protection as all others.
As early as 1968 the Proclamation of Tehran recognized the right of
parents “to determine freely and responsibly the number and the spacing of
their children.”235 This right was then reiterated in the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), to
which 189 states are parties.236 Out of those, only nine raised reservations
regarding Article 16(1)(e), which makes a clear reference to the
reproductive rights of women and men.237 Still, the strong objections that
were subsequently made by other state-parties to these reservations,238
combined with the wide ratification of the CEDAW,239 indicate a strong
acceptance of reproductive rights by the international community as early
as 1979.
However, it was only recently that sexual and gender-based violence
that occurred during armed conflict was directly connected with the
violation of women’s human rights, including their reproductive rights.240
232. Soh Sie Eng, supra note 73, at 328, 330.
233. Vienna Declaration, supra note 149.
234. THE U.N. POPULATION FUND, DANISH INST. FOR HUM. RTS., AND U.N. OFF. OF THE
HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS ARE HUMAN RIGHTS: A HANDBOOK
FOR NATIONAL HUMAN R IGHTS INSTITUTIONS 13 (2014).
235. International Conference on Human Rights, Final Act of the International
Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41, at 4 (May 12, 1968).
236. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art.
16(1)(e), Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
237. The nine countries are Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Malta, Monaco, Niger,
and the United Arab Emirates. See CEDAW, supra note 236.
238. See id. at 16 (objections made by Denmark against the reservation made by Niger on
Article 16(1)(e)); id. at 21 (objection made by Finland against the reservation made by
Bahrain on Article 16); id. at 23 (objection made by France against the reservation made by
the United Arab Emirates on Article 16). State Parties principally argued that the
reservations made by certain states went against the object and purpose of the Convention.
239. There are currently 189 State Parties to the CEDAW. CEDAW, supra note 236.
240. Ted Alcorn, Responding to Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict, 383 THE LANCET
2034, 2034 (2014).
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In fact, it was only in 1998 that the U.N. Human Rights Commission first
condemned the violation of the human rights of women in situations of
armed conflict, recognized them to be violations of international human
rights and humanitarian law and called for a particularly effective response
to violations of this kind, including forced pregnancy.241
In 2022, the international community also celebrated the twentysecond anniversary of the first Security Council resolution recognizing the
impact of armed conflict on women and girls. This became the first
Women, Peace, and Security resolution.242 The Women, Peace, and
Security resolution sought to implement an action plan to ensure the
participation of women in peace negotiations and focused on incorporating
a gender perspective in field operations.243 In accordance with the Women,
Peace, and Security agenda, the Security Council has stressed the
importance of protecting access to reproductive health (including abortion)
in armed conflicts.244
In 2019, however, the United States challenged the recognition of
reproductive rights as human rights in the annual meeting of the Security
Council on sexual and gender-based violence.245 The United States
threatened to veto the resolution if language implicitly referring to abortion
as a reproductive right was used.246 This backlash was widely contested by
other members of the Security Council, including Belgium, the Dominican
Republic, the United Kingdom, France and South Africa, all of whom
stressed that sexual and reproductive health rights were part of the
fundamental right to women’s health, and should therefore be upheld.247
Different U.N. bodies have also consistently recognized reproductive
health rights in relation to the protection and promotion of human rights.

241. Commission on Human Rights Res. 1998/5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1998/5, ¶ 4
(Mar. 17, 1998).
242. U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4213th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000). See also
SARAH TAYLOR & GRETCHEN BALDWIN, INT’L PEACE INST., FOCUS ON 2020: OPPORTUNITIES
FOR THE TWENTIETH A NNIVERSARY OF RESOLUTION 1325 1 (2019).
243. U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4213th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325, at 1, 5, (Oct. 31, 2000).
244. U.N. SCOR, 68th Sess., 6984th mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2106 (June 24, 2013).
See Jennifer Thomson & Claire Pierson, Can Abortion Rights Be Integrated into the Women,
Peace and Security Agenda? 20 IFJP 350, 356–57 (2018) (explaining the Women, Peace
and Security resolutions of the U.N. Security Council have been criticized for their lack of
explicit references to the importance of respecting the human rights of women, including
their reproductive rights, during armed conflicts).
245. U.N. GAOR, 74th Sess., 44th plen. mtg., at 12, U.N. Doc. A/74/PV.44 (Dec. 11,
2019) (statement of France).
246. U.N. SEC. COUNCIL, IN HINDSIGHT: NEGOTIATIONS ON RESOLUTION 2467 ON SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
IN
CONFLICT
(2019),
[available
at:
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2019/05/in-hindsight-negotiations-onresolution-2467-on-sexual-violence-in-conflict.php] (last visited Apr. 4, 2022).
247. U.N. SCOR, 74th Sess., 8514th mtg., at 15, 20, 26, 28, 30, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8514
(Apr. 23, 2019) (statements of Belgium and South Africa).
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First, the General Assembly explicitly referred to reproductive rights248 in
many of its resolutions,249 including its most recent 2020 Global Health and
Foreign Policy resolution.250 It also reaffirmed its accord with the Beijing
Platform of Actions.251 Twenty-five years since its adoption, this platform
is still relevant because it recognizes that the “human rights of women
include their right to have control over and decide freely and responsibly
on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive
health.”252 Even though they are non-binding, the General Assembly
resolutions are a relevant tool to assess the position of states on public
international law matters and can be used to observe the evolution of
norms.253 In this case, the numerous resolutions and their strong language
show that states do consider reproductive rights an integral part of human
rights law.254
Second, in its updated General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,255 the U.N. Human
Rights Committee (UNHRC) linked the right to life to the access to safe
abortion for women and girls–and thus to reproductive rights.256 While
recognizing that states can regulate abortion laws, the UNHRC stresses the
fact that states should remove obstacles to reproductive health.257 If it still
imposes limitations, these limitations should be constructed with respect to
women’s right to life, without discrimination or arbitral interference in their
privacy.258
Third, the evolution of the reproductive rights of women, including
their right to access abortion, is worth mentioning. In the past seventy-five
years, international human rights law has significantly contributed to the

248. U.N. GAOR 74th Sess., 126th plen. mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/74/20 (Dec. 11,
2019).
249. See U.N. GAOR 65th Sess., 61st plen. mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/95 (Dec. 9,
2010); U.N. GAOR 67th Sess., 53rd plen. mtg., at 11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/81* (Dec. 12,
2012); U.N. GAOR 70th Sess., 80th plen. mtg., at 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/70/183 (Dec. 17,
2015); U.N. GAOR 72nd Sess., 72nd plen. mtg. at 2, 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/72/139 (Dec. 12,
2017).
250. U.N. GAOR 74th Sess., 126th plen. mtg., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/74/20 (Dec. 11,
2019).
251. U.N. GAOR 74th Sess., 50th plen. mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/74/128 (Dec. 18,
2019).
252. Beijing Convention, supra note 1, at ¶ 96.
253. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226 (July 8).
254. It is to be noted, however, that some states, including the United States, have
explicitly declared that these resolutions did not create a new international right for abortion.
See U.N. GAOR 74th Sess., 126th plen. mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/74/20 (Dec. 11, 2019).
255. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 168.
256. U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶ 8 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36, (2018).
257. Id.
258. Id.
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enhancement of the rights of women.259 Specifically, it has impacted how
states have integrated a greater recognition for reproductive rights in their
criminal and human rights frameworks.260
A few examples illustrate this change. In Africa, state-parties to the
Maputo Protocol are required to “protect the reproductive rights of women
by authorizing medical abortion in cases of sexual assault, rape, incest, and
where the continued pregnancy endangers the mental and physical health
of the mother or the life of the mother or the fetus.”261 The European Court
of Human Rights found that forbidding a woman to have access to
reproductive health services, including abortion, when the pregnancy was
the result of rape amounted to “inhuman or degrading treatment.”262 In the
Americas, the Committee of Experts on Violence observed that forcing a
survivor of rape to carry a pregnancy against her will could constitute a
form of torture.263
In addition, only twenty-six countries today still prohibit abortion in
cases of rape.264 As human rights law has evolved, a convention on crime
against humanity should exemplify this evolution and the progress made.
Since the concerns that were raised before the addition of this caveat do not
hold the same relevance today, it would be unreasonable to maintain such
a caveat in a definition of the crime of forced pregnancy.
Given the progression of the inclusion of reproductive rights in
international human rights law, the current definition is problematic. It fails
to represent the progress that has occurred over the last two decades in
relation to the individual autonomy and physical integrity of women. Like
the definition of gender that was heavily criticized and deemed outdated by
states, the definition of forced pregnancy and the way it supersedes national
laws over the protection of women is obsolete.

259. U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., WOMEN’S RIGHTS ARE HUMAN
RIGHTS 3–5, U.N. Sales No. E.14.XIV.5 (2014).
260. For instance, the UNHRC urges states not to regulate reproductive rights of women
in a way that would be against the rights to life of women and girls as well as other rights
protected under the ICCPR. See U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, General Comment No. 36 on
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶ 8 U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/GC/36, (2018).
261. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa art. 14(2)(c), adopted July 11, 2003, reprinted in Martin Semalulu
Nsibirwa, A Brief Analysis of the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
People’s Rights in Africa, 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 40, 53 (2001).
262. P. and S. v. Poland, Case. No. 57375/08, Appeal, ¶ 56 (Oct. 30, 2012),
263. Org. of Am. States, Second Follow-up Report on the Recommendations of the
Committee of Experts of the MSECVI, 111, Doc. OEA/Ser.L/II (Oct. 2014).
264. The
World’s
Abortion
Laws,
CTR.
FOR
REPROD.
RTS.,
https://reproductiverights.org/worldabortionlaws#law-policy-guide (last visited Apr. 4,
2022).
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2. The promotion of gender mainstreaming in all fields of public
international law
As the fundamental rights of women are increasingly recognized and
protected in international law, the concept of gender mainstreaming has
also gained importance in the field.265 Emphasis has been placed on the use
of gender perspective as a tool to better fight discriminatory practices and
gender-biased institutions. The Security Council even recognized in its
Resolution 2493 (2019) that the year 2020 presented a great opportunity to
advance the rights of women and girls,266 and urged the Secretariat and
agencies of the U.N. to mainstream a gender perspective in their
activities.267 This section addresses why a definition of the crime of forced
pregnancy should mainstream gender, and how it would affect both the
additional intention and the national caveat.
Gender mainstreaming has been used in different circumstances: (1)
during peace processes, especially during the negotiations and conclusion
of peace agreements;268 (2) in the work of the U.N., including in the
resolutions passed by the Security Council,269 the General Assembly,270 and
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC);271 (3) in international law

265. Gender mainstreaming is defined as “[t]he process of assessing the implications for
women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies, or programs, in all
areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and
experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation
of policies and programs in all political, economic, and societal spheres so that women and
men benefit equally, and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender
equality.” Gender Mainstreaming, U.N. WOMEN, https://www.unwomen.org/en/how-wework/un-system-coordination/gender-mainstreaming (last visited Apr. 4, 2022).
266. U.N. SCOR, 74th Sess., 8649th mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2493 (Oct. 29, 2019).
Most notably, the world is celebrating the 27th anniversary of the Fourth World Conference
on Women in Beijing and its Platform of Actions. See Beijing Convention, supra note 1, at
51. The Beijing Platform of Actions promoted the development of policies that would
mainstream gender in order to eliminate violence against women and girls, including sexual
and gender-based violence. Id.
267. U.N. SCOR, 74th Sess., 8649th mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2493 (Oct. 29, 2019).
268. J. Alvarado Cóbar et al., Assessing Gender Perspectives in Peace Processes with
Application to the Cases of Colombia and Mindanao, 6 SIPRI INSIGHT ON PEACE & SEC. 8,
8–9, (2018).
269. See generally U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4213th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31,
2000); U.N. SCOR, 63rd Sess., 5916th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008); U.N.
SCOR, 64th Sess., 6195th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1888 (Sept. 30, 2009); U.N. SCOR, 64th
Sess., 6196th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1889 (Oct. 5, 2009); U.N. SCOR, 65th Sess., 6453rd
mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1960 (Dec. 16, 2010); U.N. SCOR, 68th Sess., 6984th mtg. U.N.
Doc. S/RES/2106 (June 24, 2013); U.N. SCOR, 68th Sess., 7044th mtg. U.N. Doc.
S/RES/2122 (Oct. 18, 2013); U.N. SCOR, 70th Sess., 7533rd mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/2242
(Oct. 13, 2015); U.N. SCOR, 74th Sess., 8514th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/2467 (Apr. 23,
2019); U.N. SCOR, 74th Sess., 8649th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/2493 (Oct. 29, 2019).
270. Taylor & Baldwin, supra note 242, at 1 n.2.
271. See generally, Economic and Social Council Res. E/RES/2015/6 (July 13, 2018).
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making processes;272 (4) in the course of criminal investigation;273 and (5)
by international criminal courts in reparation orders.274
Yet, the decision to replicate the definition of forced pregnancy from
the Rome Statute in the Draft Articles represents a failure of the ILC to
effectively mainstream gender in its process.275 An important aspect of
gender mainstreaming is the inclusion of a gender-sensitive approach
during the policy-making process.276 This notably means recognizing the
unique experience of women in armed conflicts.277
Against this backdrop, the adverse impact of forced pregnancies on the
victims is unequivocal. There is the extreme physical pain suffered by most
victims of sexual violence.278 In addition, the legal representatives of
victims explained, when discussing the harm suffered by the victims in the
Ongwen case, that:
The most affected group [of women who suffered mental distress]
is the women who returned from the bush with children [i.e., the
women who returned to their village after the abduction]. This may
be in part related to the sexual violence they had experience[d]:
Sexual violence survivors are particularly likely to suffer ongoing
mental health difficulties . . . However, it is also likely due to the
particular problems of shame and stigma experienced by women
who returned to communities with children born in the [Lord Army

272. U.N. WOMEN, GENDER MAINSTREAMING: A GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING
GENDER EQUALITY & THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN AND GIRLS 2 (2020); Policy Areas of
the
Council
of
Europe,
COUNCIL
OF
EUR.,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/genderequality/policy-areas-of-the-council-of-europe
(last
visited Apr. 4, 2022).
273. See generally OFF. OF THE PROSECUTOR, POLICY PAPER ON SEXUAL AND GENDERBASED CRIMES, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1 (2014) [available at: https://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-policy-paper-on-sexual-and-gender-based-crimes—june-2014.pdf]
(last visited Apr. 4, 2022).
274. See Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and Sentence of
Judge Pangalangan, ¶ 34 (Sept. 27, 2017).
275. See Chappell, supra note 37, at 20. It is important to note, however, that, except for
the definition of the crime of forced pregnancy, the definition of the crimes against humanity
found in the Rome Statute (and now proposed in the Draft Articles by the ILC) is
successfully mainstreaming gender. More precisely, the list of sexual crimes prohibited is
not exhaustive. It therefore gives the possibility for future prosecutors to raise charges for
other types of sexual and gender-based crimes that have not been foreseen yet. The
definition also expressly recognizes that gender-based violence can also amount to crimes
against humanity under certain circumstances (e.g., the crime of persecution).
276. See OFF. OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 273, at 3. It encourages the relevant
stakeholders to better understand the “differences in status, power, roles, and needs between
males and females, and the impact of gender on people’s opportunities and interactions […]”
and enables policymakers, negotiators, practitioners, advocates, and academics to better
grasp “the crimes, as well as the experiences of individuals and communities in particular
society.” Id.
277. Chappell, supra note 37, at 6.
278. Gaggioli, supra note 27, at 522.
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Resistance], as well as consequential social problems such as an
inability to marry or access land.279
The crime of forced pregnancy has important adverse consequences on
the victim, both physical and mental. Conflict-related forms of sexual
violence, including forced pregnancies, are used as weapons of war to
attack or destabilize a group.280 However, the definition of the crime should
not overlook the deep social, financial, and emotional consequences this
crime has on the victim herself. A definition that fails to grasp this impact
dismisses the experience of women and is insensitive to their reality.281
This, however, is the consequence of the Draft Articles, as they
establish the requirement to prove in the first intent alternative that forced
pregnancies are intended to affect the ethnic composition of a population.282
This intent requirement perpetuates the perception in international criminal
law that a violation against a woman is primarily a violation against the
ethnic group to which she belongs.283 A gender mainstreaming approach
calls for eliminating this first intent alternative to focus solely on the
experience of the victim.
Gender mainstreaming also calls for deletion of the second intent
alternative to carry out other grave violations. Prior to the jurisprudence of
the ICTR, the definition of rape “failed to recognize the violent and
individual aspect of rape.”284 Similarly, the current definition of forced
pregnancy fails to capture the very essence of this crime. As stated by the
Ongwen, Pre-Trial Decision, this crime is about “placing the victim in a
position in which she cannot choose whether to continue the [involuntary]
pregnancy.”285 The definition of the crime should thus only focus on the
violation of her reproductive rights without requiring another intent.
The experience of victims of forced pregnancy should not be
undermined with the requirement of an often-irrelevant intention.
Especially when this additional intention does not relate to her fundamental
rights, nor does it accurately acknowledge her suffering. To ensure that the
reality experienced by victims of sexual violence is not overlooked, a
gender-sensitive perspective requires that the definition accurately reflect
the harm that forced pregnancy inflicts on women.286
Furthermore, a gender mainstreaming approach requires deletion of the
exceptions allowed for national laws. As emphasized by the Global Justice
279. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, Victims’ Closing Brief, ¶ 373
(Mar. 31, 2019).
280. U.N. SCOR, 63rd Sess., 5916th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008).
281. COTTIER, ET AL., supra note 47, at 434.
282. Draft Articles, supra note 15.
283. Chappell, supra note 37, at 7.
284. Id. at 11.
285. Ongwen Trial Judgment, supra note 43, at ¶ 99.
286. WOMEN’S INITIATIVES FOR GENDER JUST., THE HAGUE PRINCIPLES ON SEXUAL
VIOLENCE 5 (2019).
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Center in its submission to the ILC, “forced pregnancy is the only act which
includes a caveat on national laws, which arbitrarily differentiates between
forced pregnancy and other acts constituting crimes against humanity.” 287
This exception inevitably raises the question of whether the ILC
evaluated the trauma experienced by the victims of such a crime before
integrating the caveat in the Draft Articles. The mere fact that the
prohibition of reproductive violence against women in international
criminal law still depends on the national laws of each state fails to
seriously recognize the harm done to women victims of forced pregnancy.
Neglecting to incorporate gender perspective could lead to reproduction of
the national caveat to the definition in a future convention.288
In summary, the Sixth Committee should ensure to reflect the progress
made in international human rights law to ensure the effectiveness and
continuity of a future convention on crimes against humanity. It should not
overlook the increased recognition of the reproductive rights of women. In
light of the norms and values of the present era, the Sixth Committee should
also include a gender-sensitive approach in its drafting process.

IV. CONCLUSION
As Louise Chappell writes, “[o]pportunities can also arise from the
creation of new institutions, such as the introduction of a bill of rights or
women’s policy agencies in the bureaucracy.”289 According to Chappell,
“institutions are dynamic rather than static entities.”290
These statements encapsulate an overall theme of this article: the Sixth
Committee’s consideration of a future convention highlights that change is
possible. This article has shown that various organs of the U.N. and NGOs
have already largely agreed on the importance of consciously drafting
policies that mainstream gender to promote and protect the rights of
women. In the drafting of a future convention, the Sixth Committee must
now include women, as gender mainstreaming begins with a greater
implication of women in decision-making processes.291
This article has presented three arguments supporting why the
definition proposed by the ILC should be modified in a future convention
on crimes against humanity. First, the additional intent requirement is
gender biased. It fails to effectively protect the rights of women, does not
focus on the gravity of the harms done to the victim personally, and
287. SHUBIN, supra note 9, at 5.
288. Chappell, supra note 37, at 11.
289. Id. at 4.
290. Id.
291. See generally Taylor & Baldwin, supra note 242; Paola Profeta, Gender Equality in
Decision-Making Positions: The Efficiency Gains, 52 INTERECONOMICS 34 (2017); S.C. Res.
2493, ¶ 3 (Oct. 29, 2019); U.N GAOR, 26th Sess., 1st plen. mtg. U.N. Doc. A/56/PV.1 (May
25, 2017).

Summer 2022

FORCED PREGNANCY AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

147

perpetuates the misconception that sexual and gender-based crimes are
violations of lesser gravity in the eyes of international criminal law.
Second, the caveat accommodating national laws that was added at the
end of the definition is the clear product of a political compromise that was
made at the expense of the protection and recognition of women’s
reproductive rights. None of the violations defined in a future convention
on crimes against humanity should allow for an exception for states’
national jurisdiction. There is no place for cultural relativism in a future
convention.
Third, the field of international criminal law should be harmonized with
the other fields of public international law, especially international human
rights law. To overcome potential future criticisms, such as the ones that
were raised against the definition of “gender,” both the additional intent
requirement and the caveat for national laws must be removed from the
definition of the crime of forced pregnancy.
Accordingly, the proposed definition in a future convention should be
as follows: “‘Forced pregnancy’ means the unlawful confinement of a
woman forcibly made pregnant.” While displaying gender sensitivity, the
definition would be narrow enough to ensure that states that do not legalize
abortion do not fear prosecution for crimes against humanity. This
definition focuses on cases where the alleged perpetrator, aware that the
victim was impregnated by force, unlawfully confines the woman as part
of a widespread and systematic attack.
Today, it still seems unrealistic to propose a definition of the crime of
forced pregnancy that would be broad enough to condemn measures that
actively prohibit women from accessing abortion care in cases of forced
pregnancy or other assault.292 Nevertheless, the Sixth Committee should be
inspired by The Hague Principles on Sexual Violence, which have
proposed a definition of the crime of forced pregnancy focusing on the act
of depriving someone of reproductive autonomy.293 Since these principles
are the result of thorough work by civil society and the collection of views
and experience from practitioners, academics, and self-identified survivors
of sexual violence, these principles should be seriously taken into account
to assess how sexual and gender-based violence can be integrated in a
future convention.294
This proposed definition does not accord deference to national laws.
Under no circumstances should a direct violation of the reproductive
autonomy of a woman be deemed legal, especially not in an international
convention. Since most states today have legalized abortions for survivors

292. Grey, supra note 20, at 192 (noting this proposition had not even been put forward
by feminist groups during the drafting process of the Rome Statute).
293. The Hague Principles, supra note 286, at 18.
294. See id. at 105.
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of rape,295 there is no longer a place for compromise on this issue. The
increased recognition of the reproductive rights of women further supports
this argument.296 Alternatively, if the exception for national laws is not
removed, a further explanation of what it means should be added. As
Valerie Oosterveld proposes, this exception should be clarified to better
understand how exactly national laws can limit the prosecution of the
crime.297
This article took into account the arguments raised in favor of
replicating the current definition of crimes against humanity in a future
convention. It acknowledged the possibility that this could ensure
coherence between international criminal law instruments and national
jurisdictions. This article also recognized the work that has already been
accomplished by several states to legally integrate the crime of forced
pregnancy as defined in the Rome Statute into their respective jurisdictions.
However, the definition of the crime of forced pregnancy in these
jurisdictions is far from homogenous.298 As international law has the
potential to influence the lawmaking of national jurisdictions, it should also
promote a gender-sensitive definition in a future convention.299
Finally, since sexual and gender-based violence (including
reproductive violence) remains highly underreported and non-prosecuted,
a definition of the crime of forced pregnancy that takes into account the
violence experienced by the victims should be a priority.300 Enhancing the
prosecution of these crimes and publicly holding perpetrators accountable
would likely reduce the stigma that victims of reproductive violence suffer
295. Law and Policy Guide: Rape and Incest Exceptions, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS.,
https://reproductiverights.org/law-and-policy-guide-rape-and-incest, (last visited Apr. 4,
2022).
296. See Law and Policy Guide: Criminality, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS.,
https://reproductiverights.org/law-and-policy-guide-criminality (last visited Apr. 4, 2022).
297. Oosterveld, supra note 68, at 100–01.
298. Various national criminal codes do not define the crime of forced pregnancy as a
crime against humanity. See C.I.CR./SV. (Belg.), art. 136; C.C. art. 172(2)(f) (Bos. & Herz.);
C.C. §3(4) (Fin.); CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 212-1 (Fr.); [Act on the Punishment, etc. of
Crimes Under the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court] art. 2 para. 6 (S. Kor.);
C.C. art. 29(g) (Mali); C.C. §102(g) (Nor.). Other jurisdictions have preferred not to
replicate the caveat to national laws. See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE],
§ 2254 (Ger.); C.C. art. 371 (Serb.); C.C. art. 439(f) (Rom.); C.P. art. 607 (Spain);
SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [CRIMINAL CODE] Dec. 21, 1937, SR 311
(1941), as amended by No.1 of the FA, Sept. 30, 2011, AS 2575 (2012), art. 264a(g)
(Switz.); International Criminal Court Act 2001, c. 17, art. 7(2)(f) (U.K.).
299. This view was expressly shared by Sweden on behalf of the Nordic Countries. See
ILC, Fourth Report, supra note 16, ¶ 26. See also U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law
and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 49, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616
(Aug. 23, 2004) (stating the Rome Statute has served as a catalyst for enacting national laws
against the gravest international crimes).
300. See INT’L FED’N FOR HUM. RTS., UNHEARD, UNACCOUNTED: TOWARDS
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE AT THE ICC AND BEYOND 47
(2018). See also AMNESTY INT’L, RAPE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE: HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND
STANDARDS IN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 6 (2011).
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and would enhance their trust in the international criminal law system.301
Overall, the proposed definition in this article is not limited to only
promoting the rights of women and girls nor does it only advocate for a
gender-sensitive approach. Above all, the proposed definition aligns with
the goal of the proposed Draft Articles of the ILC for a future convention,
which is not only to prevent the perpetration of international crimes, but
also to fight against their impunity.302

301. González v. Mexico, Judgment of Judge Quiroga, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
214, ¶ 400 (Nov. 6, 2009); LADISCH, supra note 2, at 21, 27; Charlesworth, supra note 26,
at 391.
302. See ILC, Fourth Report, supra note 16, at 13 (proposing a preamble for the Draft
Articles including the intent to “put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes
and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.”).
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